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The U.S. Federal Government has taken an increasingly active role in disaster 
relief efforts, yet program analyses of the efficacy of Federal recovery programs—
particularly for businesses—is limited. This dissertation fills the gap by exploring the 
effects of Federal disaster loans on long-term business post-disaster recovery outcomes. 
Using the case of the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program 
in Galveston County Texas after 2008 Hurricane Ike, this research examines which 
businesses benefit from Federal assistance and whether loans improved odds of survival 
for businesses nine years after Hurricane Ike. 
This dissertation contributes to the body of work on disaster assistance programs 
and business recovery through new methodological and theoretical approaches to these 
questions. This research is grounded in institutional theory, namely institutional logics 
and resource dependence, and uses quasi-experimental design to tease out the effect of 
the loan program from potential confounding factors that affect business survival.  This 
research uses a combination of primary data collected directly from the field and 
secondary data, such as business information reported by ReferenceUSA, sales tax and 
franchise tax permit information from the Texas State Comptroller, and data provided by 
the SBA through Freedom of Information Act requests. Coarsened Exact Matching is 
used to match businesses that received a loan (treatment sample) to businesses without a 
loan but otherwise similar in damage and firm characteristics (matched sample).  For the 




loans on survival. For the treatment-only sample, linear regression and logistic 
regression are used to examine determinants of loan amount and which businesses are 
more likely to utilize the loans.  
This research found that businesses that received a loan had higher odds of 
survival compared to their control, however businesses differed in the amount of money 
their received and likelihood of accepting the loan based on their damage, their 
characteristics, and the characteristics of the loan, itself.  This research concludes with 
suggestions of how disaster policy aimed at businesses might be improved, as well as 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Federal Government’s involvement in the disaster recovery process has been 
steadily increasing since the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1953, the Federal 
Government provided only one percent of U.S. disaster relief, but by the mid-1970s the 
federal share had increased to more than 70 percent (Clary, 1985, p. 24). At present, the 
Stafford Act outlines the process for federal disaster assistance and how the costs will be 
shared among federal, state and local governments, with the federal share capping at 75 
percent (Moss, Schellhamer, & Berman, 2009). This results in several billion dollars of 
assistance; the 2017 disaster season, for example, resulted in a record high of over $130 
billion in federal spending (Lingle, Kousky, & Shabman, 2018). 
Although the Federal Government has taken an increasingly active role in 
disaster relief efforts, program analyses of the effectiveness of these programs are 
relatively scarce. The literature that does exist is mixed: studies attempting to quantify 
the role of assistance on business recovery have reported a positive relationship 
(McDonald, Florax, & Marshal, 2014), a negative relationship (Dahlhamer & Tierney, 
1998), and no significant relationship at all (Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2002). 
Although additional capital after a disaster may seem beneficial on its face, the primary 
source of assistance for businesses in the United States comes in the form of loans rather 
than grants. Authors have suggested that the additional debt burden put upon an already 
capital-vulnerable business reduces the effectiveness of this type of assistance 




that are the most damaged are the ones receiving assistance, and are therefore less likely 
to survive regardless of their assistance status (Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1998). The 
qualitative literature on federal assistance shows dissatisfaction with the process and 
implementation of the program, indicating a potential mismatch between the needs of the 
businesses and the structure of the assistance as it exists currently (Furlong & Scheberle, 
1998; Runyan, 2006). 
 This research, therefore, contributes to our understanding of the influence of 
federal assistance on the recovery of businesses by looking more deeply at several of 
these issues and breaking them into separate research questions. Specifically, this 
dissertation will examine the outcome success of federal assistance to businesses by 
looking at the largest federal assistance program available to businesses, the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program, and its implementation in 
Galveston, TX after Hurricane Ike. This dissertation will use this case to explore several 
research questions related to the effectiveness of loans on long-term survival. Following 
the work of Furlong and Scheberle (1998), I propose a holistic approach to the study of 
loan effectiveness, taking the perspective of both the loan provider and the receivers of 
the assistance to understand not only the outcome of interest, but also why that outcome 
occurs, and how the program may be realistically improved. 
First, it’s necessary to understand the participation in the program and who is 
most likely to be approved for and ultimately take disaster loans. These issues can be 
approached from the side of the SBA as well as the business, namely that the SBA 




participate in the program once they are approved. This has consequences for the study 
in that these businesses may be more likely to survive or fail at the onset (Dahlhamer & 
Tierney, 1998). Therefore, the first set of research questions relate to program 
participation: 
 
Research Question 1. Which businesses benefit from the SBA loan program? 
Research Question 1.1. What determines loan amount? 
Research Question 1.2. Which businesses are more likely to use SBA 
loans in recovery? 
 
Secondly, empirical research is mixed on the influence of federal assistance, 
including SBA loans, on business recovery. This research will provide additional 
evidence to research question:  
 
Research Question 2. Do SBA loans improve survival probabilities in the long 
term? 
 
The benefits of conducting this research are two-fold. First, the annual 
expenditures on disaster recovery for businesses naturally lead to a question of their 
effectiveness from a government accountability perspective—how best can this money 
be used so that it has its intended outcome (i.e. help businesses recover)? Secondly, 




recovery. Businesses contribute to psychological well-being of residents after a disaster 
(Liu, Black, Lawrence, & Garrison, 2012) and influence household return (Xiao & Van 
Zandt, 2012). Understanding how to best encourage business recovery, particularly small 
businesses, has both social and economic consequences.  
To answer the proposed research questions, I will utilize a research design and 
methodology more akin to program or policy analysis to isolate the effect of the loan 
program from potential confounding variables. I will also incorporate institutional theory 
(namely institutional logics and resource dependence) as well as the empirical business 
and disaster research to understand the intersection of organizational behavior, 
environmental pressure, and business characteristics on long-term survival.  
This dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 begins with a literature 
review of the factors influencing business performance after disasters, a review of 
recovery assistance in the disaster literature, and theoretical perspectives relevant to this 
research. Section 3 combines the literature into a conceptual framework for this research 
and justifies the hypotheses to be tested. Section, then, 4 discusses the research design, 
including the research context, data sources, analytical method, and reliability and 
validity of the study. Section 5 presents the results of this research and, lastly, Chapter 6 
provides discussion on the support for the various hypotheses; implications for planning, 






2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As previously introduced, this research will take a holistic approach to 
understanding the effectiveness of loan as a recovery tool by examining whether the 
assistance is effective, why, and how it might be improved. Therefore, I will review the 
historical context of federal assistance and its evaluation in the literature in addition to 
the factors influencing business performance after disasters. I will also review two 
theoretical perspectives—institutional logics, and resource dependence—to provide 
additional perspective on the motivations of organizations in the recovery context, the 
role of resources (in general) in organizational strategy, and how organizations react to 
and are affected by the external environment.  
 
2.1. Business Disaster Assistance: History, Current Programs, and Empirical 
Evidence of Effectiveness 
Although the amount of federal spending on disasters has gotten recent attention 
(Lingle et al., 2018; Trusts, 2018), the practice of federal involvement in disaster 
recovery has been around for over a century. The first federal disaster relief grants or 
loans to individuals occurred in 1915 but was not embraced as the standard for disaster 
relief: up until 1950, there were 128 disaster relief acts adopted by Congress (Barnett, 
1999). A majority of these acts did not provide individual assistance but instead 




The current U.S. policy of individual loans began in 1949 with the establishment of the 
US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) emergency 
disaster loan program (Barnett, 1999). Through this program, farmers and ranchers that 
had been affected by a natural disaster could apply for low-interest loans (Barnett, 1999). 
Loans to businesses post-disaster began in 1953 after the establishment of the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (Barnett, 1999). The same year, public law 1953 allowed 
individuals impacted to receive surplus federal supplies (the 1950 act only gave aid to 
state and local governments) (Clary, 1985). Loans to businesses surprisingly came 
before loans to individual households—the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 was the first to 
create a loan program to households (Lindsay & Murray, 2010).  
In general, there has been a “steady expansion of federal aid” and government 
involvement since the disaster relief act of 1950, which was the first legislative act to 
create a comprehensive national relief system (Clary, 1985; Lindsay & Murray, 2010). 
The major legislation that currently dictates government involvement after natural 
disasters is the Stafford Act. Passed in 1988 and most recently amended in 2016, the 
Stafford Act outlines the process for federal disaster assistance including how the costs 
will be shared among federal state and local governments (75 percent federal, 25 percent 
state and local) (Moss et al., 2009). Although there is an annual Disaster Relief Fund, 
there are often supplemental appropriations that are passed through Congress to go 
beyond the scope of the Stafford Act (Moss et al., 2009). Clary (1985) notes that in 1953 
the federal government provided only 1.0 percent of US disaster relief. By the mid-




an average of close to $2 billion in Stafford Act related assistance each year around the 
time of Hurricane Ike (Moss et al., 2009). The recent 2017 disaster season in the United 
States incurred an estimated $300 billion worth of damages to which the U.S. Federal 
Government spent a record $130 billion in response (Lingle, Kousky, & Shabman, 
2018). 
Most of the current funding is used primarily for public assistance, for example 
rebuilding infrastructure, debris removal, and emergency life safety measures. To 
illustrate, the largest amount of disaster supplemental appropriations between 2017 and 
2018 were given to the Department of Homeland Security (programs managed by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency). These appropriations totaled approximately 
$50.7 billion, with 47 percent of those funds historically going to the public assistance 
program (Lingle et al., 2018). For an individual, non-agricultural businesses, the largest 
source of post-disaster governmental assistance is the U.S. Small Business 
Administration where homeowners and businesses can apply for low-interest loans. 
According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) “U.S. Small 
Business Administration disaster loans are the primary source of federal long-term 
disaster-recovery funds for loss and damage not fully covered by insurance or other 
compensation” (FEMA, 2018). In 2008, the SBA Disaster Loan Program had 
$959,000,000 in obligations; in 2017 its obligations were estimated at $1,600,000,000 
(U.S. General Services Administration, 2008, 2017). 
When it comes to academic research on the effectiveness of these programs, only 




disasters. Internationally, Fischer-Smith (2013) examined the Earthquake Support 
Subsidy that was provided to businesses after the February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake. The subsidy gave financial support for businesses to retain staff for six 
weeks (later extended).  Business that were interviewed generally had a positive view of 
the program. The program was implemented very quickly (one week after the 
earthquake). It supports the idea of iteration proposed by Olshansky, Hopkins, and 
Johnson (2012) by allowing businesses to retain and take care of employees while 
freeing-up time and capacity for the business to deal with other post-disaster issues. 
Businesses were able to make more sound decisions without having to worry about their 
cash flow (Fischer-Smith, 2013, p. 45 & 47).  
The Earthquake Support Subsidy is unique because it took the form of a grant. 
Government aid to businesses in the U.S., however, generally takes the form of loans. 
There is also a historical pattern of dissatisfaction with government intervention after 
disasters due to the bureaucratic nature of the process. Furlong and Scheberle (1998), for 
example, looked at the gaps in perceptions of small business owners and government 
officials about federal assistance after the Northridge earthquake, noting that “those not 
happy with either FEMA or SBA pointed toward the belief that there was too much 
paperwork and that the process for applying for assistance was too time-consuming” (p. 
374). Additionally, the SBA Disaster Loan Program and private loans require paperwork 
such as financial statements and tax returns. These records can be lost due to the disaster, 




mismatch of expectations between businesses and the federal agencies proving the 
assistance, as described by Furlong and Scheberle (1998): 
 
“…only about a third of small business owners interviewed believed that either 
the SBA or FEMA understood their concerns, provided assistance that was useful 
to them, or acted promptly to meet their needs...On the other hand, most of the 
SBA and FEMA staff believe that individuals have unreasonable expectations for 
what government should (or can) do to assist them in recovering from a disaster. 
For example, an unprofitable business should not expect to receive an SBA loan 
any more than an individual should expect a FEMA grant if they are able to 
qualify for an SBA loan instead” (p. 383). 
 
The SBA bases repayment ability on the businesses’ profitability before the 
disaster, and it’s true that most businesses in Galveston were denied an SBA loan due to 
lack of repayment ability (of the 1,042 denial codes provided by the SBA, 997 were lack 
of repayment ability or poor credit). Qualitative literature is therefore useful in 
understanding the perceptions of government aid and whether the program functions the 
same in theory and in practice.  However, there is evidence from the quantitative 
literature that indicated there are other factors that determine which businesses receive 
an SBA loan. Josephson and Marshall (2016) looked at factors influencing whether 
businesses applied for a loan, and found that “female owners, those on the coast, those 




perceived and actual damage, those with higher stress, and those making less than 
$50,000 per year were more likely to apply, while those operating from home, those with 
insurance, and those with high success before Katrina were less likely to apply” (p. 12). 
In terms of approval, “female business owners, those on the coast, those with more 
employees, those with a paid insurance claim, and several of the revenue tiers are more 
likely to be approved, while non-white owners, those who went to college, older 
businesses, and those with cash flow problems are less likely to be approved” (p.12). 
Lastly, the authors found that “married business owners, those with more experience, 
those with previous cash flow problems, and those with a paid insurance claim on their 
residence were more likely to receive a larger loan, while female owners, copreneurial 
owners, businesses on the coast, those with a paid insurance claim on their business, and 
several revenue tiers were less likely to receive a large loan” (p. 14). 
The results of this research were somewhat contradictory. The results suggest 
that businesses that were more likely to apply when they needed the money were more 
likely to be approved (e.g. businesses on the coast). However, repayment ability was a 
less clear predictor. Older businesses and businesses with cash flow problems were less 
likely to be approved, larger businesses were more likely to be approved, and businesses 
with cash flow problems received larger loans. Dahlhamer (1994) also looked at 
businesses that were more or less likely to receive a loan and found that older 
businesses, businesses that own their property, and businesses with credit availability 





Many more quantitative studies, however, include government aid after a disaster 
as a predictor in their more general recovery models. Table 1 is a summary of studies 
that include financial assistance in their analyses: 


































Government Aid Post-disaster 
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Postdisaster Aid Recovery Y Negative 18 months 
Dietch and 
Corey (2011) 
Lack of federal 
assistance 
(perception) 
Amount of gain/ 
loss in  post-
disaster 
business volume  
Y Negative 4 years 
Khan and 
Sayem (2013) 
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Y Positive 10 years 
Webb et al. 
(2002) 




N - 6-8 years 
*bold indicates U.S. research context  
 
As can be seen in Table 1, results are mixed on the effectiveness of aid in 




Different government have different aid programs and the studies in this selection span a 
variety of countries. However, those studies that focus on U.S. programs (in bold), the 
result is still mixed. Dietch and Corey (2011) found that the perceived lack of federal 
assistance was associated with loss of business volume, but this does not establish a 
causal relationship between the two since the business owners could be wrongly 
attributing their difficulties to their lack of assistance.  The other studies, however, have 
more directly tied federal assistance receipt to business outcomes. McDonald et al. 
(2014) and Stafford et al. (2013) found federal disaster receipt to be positively associated 
with recovery in the long term.  Stafford et al. (2013) took a sample of family businesses 
across the U.S. and looked specifically at family business survival, finding that 
businesses that received federal disaster assistance were more likely to remain open after 
ten years. However, the damage control variable is at the county level. McDonald et al. 
(2014) were able to control for damage at the individual business level, and found that 
small businesses that received an SBA loan were more likely to remain open seven years 
after Hurricane Katrina.  
 By contrast, Dahlhamer (1998) and Webb et al. (2002) found disaster assistance 
to be negatively associated with recovery and insignificant, respectively. Dahlhamer 
(1998) offer three possible reasons for this finding. The first is that aid could simply be 
insufficient or other factors were driving their demise. The second and third reasons are 
related. Aid to businesses is often in the form of loans, meaning that businesses could be 
reluctant to incur debt in an already unstable business environment. Therefore, aid 




aid sources used was insignificant in Webb et al. (2002). More aid sources may mean 
more severe damage as well as more debt.  
To summarize, addressing the role of assistance in business recovery is complex 
and the existing literature has not found consensus on whether it is effective in 
promoting recovery or survival. To answer the research questions posed by this 
dissertation, therefore, I extend the review beyond the empirical evidence of disaster 
assistance and business recovery to a broader understanding of the factors influencing 
business performance after natural disasters. I also review relevant theoretical literature. 
Together, this literature can provide a better understanding of business characteristics 
that affect post-disaster performance, the role and importance of the environment in 
business selection processes and resource attainment, and strategies and foundations of 
organizational behavior that affect their ability to adapt. Ultimately this research can 
help us understand how a disaster affects a business, how a business might respond to 
the disaster, and how assistance complements or hinders this process 
 
2.2. Empirical Factors Influencing Business Recovery  
The empirical literature on businesses and disasters identifies a variety of factors 
that influence a business’s performance after a disaster that will need to be considered 
when examining the research questions. These factors range from the availability and 
nature of critical business inputs, the management and operational processes of the 
businesses, and external factors related the disaster and community as a whole. I discuss 




2.2.1. Critical Inputs 
To begin, there are a few key inputs that businesses require in order to function; 
broadly, all businesses require capital, suppliers, labor, and customers in order to provide 
a good or service.  In a disaster situation, however, the availability and fashion in which 
the business utilizes these components can also make a business more or less vulnerable 
(Zhang, Lindell, & Prater, 2009). Consider capital and labor. Amount of capital and 
labor is important after a disaster because more resources directed at solving an issue 
seem intuitively better than fewer. Business size and age are often used as indicators of 
business performance due to the amount of capital resources a business is likely to 
have—the larger and older the business, the more resources it probably has to dedicate to 
recovery (Brunton, 2012; Runyan, 2006; Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2000; Zhang et 
al., 2009). Larger, older, businesses are more likely to have multiple locations, which 
enables them to move to an alternative storefront if one location is damaged (Alesch, 
Holly, Mittler, & Nagy, 2001; Brunton, 2013; Hatton, 2015; Zhang et al., 2009).  
Similarly, franchises and chains have a wide range of locations and a larger pool of 
resources to draw from (Ergun, Heier Stamm, Keskinocak, & Swann, 2010).  
 However, it’s not simply the amount of resources but the nature of the resources 
that make capital and labor more or less effective after a disaster. A business’s capital, 
for example, consists of both the business’s physical assets as well as its liquid assets 
(such as cash or accounts receivable). A business requires physical capital in order to 
produce goods, operate out of a storefront, and assist in transactions. However, a 




even more so if the physical assets are rented as opposed to owned—whereas cash assets 
are more flexible and can be drawn upon as needed during recovery (Zhang et al., 2009). 
Similarly, with labor, franchises benefit from a large pool of labor not only because they 
have so many employees, but because they are all similarly trained across locations and 
can be substituted from other locations if need be. Zhang et al. (2009) refer to this as 
employee replaceability; businesses that rely on subcontractors, for example, have more 
flexibility (Wedawatta, Ingirige, & Jones, 2010).  
The same can then be said for customers. Having a higher number of customers 
leads to more profit, however the spatial location and demand of those customers 
matters. After a disaster, households are also damaged, which will mean changing 
markets and labor pools for a business (Alesch et al., 2001; Graham, 2007; Runyan, 
2006). In general, there are three population forces a business might contend with after a 
disaster: changing demand in the resident population, new population influx from 
recovery workers, and more permanent population changes due to in-migrants bringing 
different markets and population loss due to dislocation and displacement. Changing 
demand in the resident population can stem from household damage, where residents 
have less purchasing power and their priorities are focused on the rebuilding and repair 
of their homes and property (Alesch et al., 2001). This can have a disproportionate 
impact on business sectors, where retail and sectors catering to discretionary spending 
see less business and construction or manufacturing business might see a boom in 
residents needing services, tools, and raw materials during recovery (Alesch et al., 2001; 




Change in demand can also come from temporary relief and recovery workers, 
where accommodation businesses may be able to take advantage of the need for 
temporary housing and restaurants that are able to open quickly will be able to serve 
relief workers and residents who are unable to cook their own meals (Runyan, 2006). 
However, relief workers will eventually leave and the resident population may or may 
not be able to provide the same level of support to these businesses, particularly tourism 
economies that are more likely to be negatively affected by the perception of the disaster 
and recovery in the media once temporary workers have gone (Wilson, 2016). As 
alluded to here, there can be long-term or even permanent population changes that might 
occur in a community after a disaster and businesses may struggle to adapt and cope 
with these effects (Alesch et al., 2001; Graham, 2007). 
Customers and supplier relate in their effect on businesses because they can both 
be located within or outside the disaster impact area (Zhang et al., 2009). Most 
businesses rely on suppliers for some piece of their business, and therefore may still 
experience interruption after a disaster through supplier damage even if their own 
premise was unaffected (Haraguchi & Lall, 2015; Zhang et al., 2009). Utilities are a 
particularly important input for a business (Al-Badi, Ashrafi, Al-Majeeni, & Mayhew, 
2009; Orhan, 2014; Piotrowski & Armstrong, 1997; K. J. Tierney & Nigg, 1995), with 
some research suggesting that loss of utilities may be similarly if not more consequential 
than the physical impacts of a disaster in terms of interrupting operations (K. J. Tierney 
& Nigg, 1995). Utility loss can result in additional damage to inventory, particularly 




retailers that stock frozen food may lose almost all of their contents due to lack of 
refrigeration caused by power loss. Although having more suppliers helps disperse risk, 
the nature of the supplier relationship is also important. Companies with strong supplier 
relationships may engage in collaborative recoveries where the supplier and receiver 
share resources (Brüning, Hartono, & Bendul, 2015). 
 To summarize, availability of these components in addition to their attributes are 
important in business recovery. This research, for example, focuses specifically on 
capital as a critical input to a business. There is little question that the existence of 
additional capital will benefit a business because it will buffer the impact of a disaster, 
however it’s also true that the nature of the capital matters. For SBA loans then, an 
important question becomes whether the nature of the capital (e.g. term, interest, and 
timing) affects business survival. 
 
2.2.2. Management and Business Operation  
The next category of variables relates to the internal processes of the business or 
how the business is run. Park, Seager, Rao, Convertino, and Linkov (2013) 
conceptualize resilience as “an emergent property of what an engineering system does, 
rather than a static property the system has. Therefore, resilience cannot be measured at 
the systems scale solely from examination of component parts” (p.1). For businesses, 
then, it is worthwhile to look not only at the attributes of the business (such as size 
discussed above), but the capacity the business has for action, adaptivity, and problem 




situational awareness, adaptive capacity, keystone vulnerabilities—renamed as disaster 
planning and preparation for the purpose of this research—and network connectivity. 
Situational awareness includes recognizing roles of both the staff and the organization at 
large as well as understanding potential hazards, their consequences, and the level of the 
organization’s exposure; this knowledge can assist in knowing what to prioritize and 
when after a disaster (McManus, 2008). Adaptive capacity is a resilience principle that 
has been used to explain resilience in both human and ecological systems (Holling & 
Gunderson, 2002). Improving adaptive capacity might include minimizing silo 
mentalities, improving communication and knowledge transfer within the organization, 
and flexibility and creativity in the leadership of the organization (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 
2005). Planning and preparation can be defined as creating a business continuity or 
recovery plan or taking actions prior to the disaster in order to minimize the physical 
impact, disruption of operation, and/or recovery time (Xiao & Peacock, 2014). Lastly, 
building and maintaining relationships with suppliers, other businesses, banks, or other 
organizations that may be able to provide post-disaster assistance can also be beneficial 
(Zhang et al., 2009). This type of social capital can help in securing additional resources 
or making it easier to find needed resources after an event (Hatton, 2015). 
Consider the discussion of critical inputs in the previous section, particularly the 
discussion on customers. After a disaster, there are several ways a community (and a 
business’s customer base) can change after a disaster due to demand changes and 
population migration. Even a business with no damage can be at risk of failure if the 




product or service is permanently altered. To survive, a business needs situational 
awareness to recognize that such a change might be happening. In the face of this 
information, adaptive capacity would then be the business’s willingness and ability to 
move or change its operation to accommodate these changes. Planning and preparation 
and network connectivity can facilitate both situational awareness and adaptive capacity. 
If a business had previously conducted a continuity or disaster recovery plan, it may 
have already identified suitable alternative locations which would make the decision to 
make much easier. Moving quickly can give a business an advantage, in that they have 
the first choice of available locations and may even be able to capitalize on reduced 
competition early on in the recovery process (Runyan, 2006). Additionally, strong 
network connectivity may facilitate collaborative recoveries, where businesses share 
locations, resources, and information (Hatton, 2015).  
Although customer issues were used as an initial example, business management 
and operational decisions can address many of the issues related to disruption of 
essential inputs. Business assets are physically vulnerable to disaster impacts, but 
through planning and preparation these contents can be elevated, secured or moved prior 
to the event (Gissing & Blong, 2004). Adaptive capacity in the face of labor disruption 
may mean that employees are given modified hours, able to work in an alternative 
location, or able to work remotely. Network connectivity in supply chains may lead to 
businesses collaborating to help a shared supplier recover (Brüning et al., 2015). In sum, 




awareness) and react to it (adaptive capacity) in a timely manner (planning and 
preparation and network connectivity). 
 
2.2.3. External Factors  
A business can also be impacted by external factors, including the nature of the 
disaster and the recovery and resources of the community as a whole. For example, the 
damage and severity of a hurricane can damage the business directly, but may also cause 
transportation issues through road closures or detours debris from standing water or 
debris. Additionally, an earthquake may cause entire blocks of buildings to be deemed 
structurally unsafe (or in need of further assessment) leading to limited access (Hatton, 
2015; Kachali et al., 2012; Stevenson et al., 2012). Even without causing access issues, 
surrounding damage can be a major problem for the tourism industry since tourism 
businesses rely on the health of the “destination” as a whole (Fitchett, Hoogendoorn, & 
Swemmer, 2016). Misinformation about the progress of recovery or incomplete or 
sensationalist media coverage can affect the perception of, and likelihood of travel to, 
impacted tourist destinations (Ghaderi, Mat Som, & Henderson, 2015; Luo, Wan, & 
Liang, 2014). This is relevant to areas like Galveston that rely on out-of-town dollars in 
addition to the resident population. In addition, government action or regulation can 
affect businesses after a disaster. At the state or local level, the permit process and 
redevelopment planning after a disaster will affect the type and timing of reconstruction 




and the uncertainty of how these may affect building codes could also slow recovery as 
businesses and households hesitate to invest in any new construction (Runyan, 2006). 
More broadly, however, the overall business climate and characteristics of the 
community can affect recovery. Much like previous financial condition can influence 
post-disaster business success, pre-disaster market trends set the initial trajectory for a 
business and influence recovery (Chang, 2010). Hurricane Ike, for example, coincided 
with the 2008 financial crisis which likely affected business recovery in several ways. It 
could decrease private banks’ willingness to lend as well as affected spending habits of 
consumers. Even without a major financial crisis, however, the overall business climate 
was cited as an important factor in recovery during Hurricane Andrew and the Loma 
Prieta Earthquake (Webb et al., 2000).  
As discussed previously, community populations dictate both supply (in terms of 
labor and production) and demand (in terms of consumers). A report following the 
Canterbury earthquakes in New Zealand writes about migration and population 
concerns: “The first (concern) is that if a large enough number of people leave, 
regardless of age and skill level, the remaining population may not be sufficient to drive 
the general economy of Christchurch/Canterbury. The second concern is that people 
with the skills required for the rebuild leave, creating a skills shortage” (Stevenson et al., 
2012). Businesses might struggle to find employees and customers due to issues ranging 
from relocation, temporary housing decisions, and inequitable housing recoveries, to rent 
increases and gentrification during disaster recovery (Pais & Elliott, 2008; Peacock, Van 




evidence that social vulnerability indicators matter in terms of household recovery in 
that recovery is not even for different socio-economic groups (Dash, Morrow, Mainster, 
& Cunningham, 2007; Levine, Esnard, & Sapat, 2007; Peacock, Morrow, & Gladwin, 
1997; Phillips, 1993; Van Zandt et al., 2012). Businesses located in areas of slower 
household recovery, or in areas of higher dislocation, may have more difficulty in 
staffing and having enough customers to maintain a profit. Therefore, including 
demographic information about the community can help to capture these inequities and 
how those might impact a business. 
 
2.3. Theoretical Perspectives 
In order to have robust models on business recovery, the empirical literature 
suggests that variables should be included that can capture a business’s ability to capture 
and maintain critical business inputs (i.e. capital, labor, suppliers, and customers) and 
make decisions in recovery in the face of changing circumstances. Models should also 
include area characteristics in order to control for recovery inequalities and overarching 
trends that may affect a business’s survival. The last step, then, is to account for what is 
known on organizational theory. This dissertation makes use of two theoretical 
perspectives. Because this research is looking at assistance provided by organizations to 
organizations, these perspectives uniquely inform this research by providing context on 
the motivations of these organizations in the recovery context, the role of resources (in 
general) in organizational strategy, and how organizations react to and are affected by 




2.3.1. Institutional Logics  
The institutional logics perspective is a meta-theory that serves as a “framework 
for analyzing the interrelationships among institutions, individuals, and organizations in 
social systems…each institutional order of the interinstitutional system distinguished 
unique organizing principles, practices, and symbols that influence individual and 
organizational behavior” (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012, p. 2).  Whereas 
previous research neo-institutional theory provided a theory for institutional 
homogeneity through isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), 
institutional logics allow for a more influential individual actor (Friedland & Alford, 
1991). Whereas neo-institutional theory is successful at a higher level of scale with an 
aggregate unit of analysis, institutional logics integrates societal-level culture with 
individual and firm-level heterogeneity (Thornton et al., 2012).  
For example, there are several institutional orders that define the interinstitutional 
system—family, community, religion, state, market, profession, corporation—and each 
are guided by a central institutional logic. Individual and organizations may be more 
centered in any of these given institutional orders which allows for variation in culture 
(p. 43). Thornton et al. (2012) explain: “organizational fields are made up of a variety of 
organizations that have their values anchored in different societal-level institutional 
orders. For example, Catholic Hospitals (religion), the American Medical Association 
(professions), Medicare (states), and Humana Inc. (corporation and market), all have a 
huge stake in the provision and payment for health care” (pp. 44-45). These logics have 




available for individuals and organizations to elaborate” (Thornton, 2004, p. 42). 
Thornton continues, “the pure ideal types approximate to a greater or lesser extent 
hybrid types that are observable in the real world” (Thornton, 2004, p. 42). For example, 
two industry-level subsets of the more general institutional logics can be observed in the 
historical evolution of the publishing industry: the editorial logic and the market logic 
(grounded in the societal-level professional and market logics) (Thornton, 2004). 
From the disaster literature side, there have been several theoretical 
conceptualizations of recovery (Chang, 2010; Drabek, 2012; Nigg, 1995; Quarantelli, 
1999; K. Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012). In particular relevance to this research, Bates 
and Peacock (1989, p. 358), drawing from Bolin and Bolton (1983, p. 358), distinguish 
between indigenous or independent recovery and exogenous or dependent recovery: “the 
idea is to think of the recovery process in terms of (1) the origin of the resources 
employed in the recovery process, such as money, materials, labor and management, and 
(2) the organization of activities carried out in the recovery process.”  Looking at these 
distinctions more broadly, I argue contribution that these processes are dictated, if not 
predicted, by the influence of three institutional logics influencing the cross-scale 
dynamics of organizational recovery: the community logic, the state logic, and the 
market logic. This analysis assumes the market logic is a constant as all commercial 
businesses must survive by market principles. Table 2 represents the ideal types of the 
three institutional logics influencing disaster recovery with the categorical elements of 





Table 2 Ideal Type Institutional Logics Instantiated in Business Recovery After 
Natural Disasters. 
  State Logic Community Logic 
Market Logic 
(Meta-logic) 















National Local Global 





Relational Network Market structure 
Exchange 
Relationships 
Arm’s Length Embedded Faceless 
Perception of Time 
Time as 
Legitimacy 
Time as a Tool Time as a Resource 
 
Research has examined the impact of the community logic on organizational 
behavior (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015; Marquis & Battilana, 2009; Marquis, Lounsbury, & 
Greenwood, 2011). Community can be based on membership (e.g. shared values, 
activity, or beliefs) or geographic proximity (Thornton et al., 2012). In this case, the 
community logic after a natural disaster refers to the local geographic community that 
was impacted. After a disaster, the community logic encourages a policy of building 
back. The community logic is the desire for a community to “return to normal” and to 
restore the previous way of life. In this way, the community logic is similar to concepts 
related to people-place relationships that have been identified in allied fields of study, 
including place identity, sense of community, sense of place and place attachment (Low 
& Altman, 1992; McMillan, 1996; Proshansky, 1978; Tuan, 1974). These concepts 
illustrate the idea that people find meaning in their environment (e.g., place attachment) 




concepts have been studied in relation to the disaster recovery process, for example the 
positive psychological impact of restoration (Silver & Grek-Martin, 2015), and the high 
amount of place attachment, identity and dependence of residents that chose to return to 
a disaster area (Chamlee‐Wright & Storr, 2009). This spatial aspect of the community 
logic often manifests as a common sense of belonging bounded by a geographic place, 
and explains why for some, it is not acceptable to build back just something or build 
back anywhere, it is acceptable to build back in the same geographic area in a way that 
represents the established community ideal in order to address feelings of dislocation 
and disorientation (Cox & Perry, 2011). For residents of the Ninth Ward after Katrina, 
“contentment, well-being, and even self could only be found in New Orleans” (Chamlee‐
Wright & Storr, 2009). Recovery, under the community logic, might represent a 
cooperative activity where community members assist each other in their clean-up and 
rebuilding, i.e., the “honeymoon phase,” (Silver & Grek-Martin, 2015). 
By contrast, the state logic is guiding the recovery dynamics at the national scale. 
The state logic represents the Federal Government under obligation to aid communities 
after a natural disaster. The United States, for example, has seen a steady strengthening 
of this logic in the last century, no doubt influenced in part due to political opinion; for 
example, Rubin (2012, p. 122) comments, “Each president’s declarations (of a 
presidential disaster) reveal something about that president as a person, as a public 
executive, and as a politician.” Hurricane Katrina serves as a recent example of the 
solidification of the state logic and the dominant opinion that the Federal Government 




resources. In general, current legislation mandates federal involvement after a disaster 
when recovery needs surpass local capacity (FEMA, 2011). Regardless of whether the 
state logic is perpetuated by politics or altruism, the state logic desires a viable 
community as an outcome. The difference between the instantiation of state and 
community logics, however, is that the state does not care about the return of a particular 
way of life, but rather the general return of an economically and socially functioning 
political entity.   
The market logic has a role in recovery, albeit as a meta-logic. Similar to the 
logic filtering identified by Lee and Lounsbury (2015), the market logic interacts with 
the state and community logics in recovery. The market logic would encourage 
rebuilding only as it relates to the broader economic goal of profitability. The market 
logic might not encourage rebuilding at all—for example, the risk of a future disaster 
may outweigh the costs of investing more infrastructure and resources into the area. 
Money and resources funneled into the community are therefore investments rather than 
donations. The market logic may also view disasters in a positive light. As in 
Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction (Reinert & Reinert, 2006; Schumpeter, 
1942a), a disaster may offer the opportunity for a business to trim down unprofitable 
activities, become more efficient, and replace outdated technology. A natural disaster 
has even been shown to increase economic activity, perhaps due to the influx of relief 
workers and the short-term construction boom (Leiter, Oberhofer, & Raschky, 2009; 
Monllor & Altay, 2016; Tanaka, 2015; Hirofumi Uchida et al., 2014; H. Uchida et al., 




sectors bear the impact of disasters differently and small businesses with fewer resources 
are less able to withstand the external shock (Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1996; Scanlon, 
1988). Whereas the community logic might be concerned with this complexity and the 
idea of “winners and losers” (Scanlon, 1988) of a natural disaster, the community desires 
the recovery of the community as a whole—the market logic makes no distinction 
beyond the aggregate net benefit. However, actors identified by both the community and 
state logics must comply and interact with the market logic. Individual businesses must 
make a profit and organizations at all levels are interested in the economic prosperity of 
the community, if motivated by different reasons.   
In addition, recovery is naturally temporal, and temporal structures, as 
summarized by Reinecke and Ansari (2015, p. 622), “are replete with cultural values and 
interests (Schein, 1992) and shape what problems appear salient, how those problems are 
coped with, and what constitutes a satisfactory solution (Huy, 2001; Zaheer, Albert, & 
Zaheer, 1999).” Previous research has provided an alternative theory of time and 
organizations by combining temporal structures with the institutional logics perspective 
(Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). Whereas Rowell, Gustafsson, and Clemente (2016, p. 308) 
suggest that practices enact values of time which are encompassed by temporal 
orientations, this research suggests that logics provide the value structure and thus the 
temporal orientation of organizations. These in turn shape practices and, in this case, the 
way in which recovery is addressed.  
For example, in the ideal type analysis, the state as perceives time as legitimacy.  




the state logic, the stakeholders are taxpayers—they have a stake in the actions of the 
government, especially when government resources are taken from taxpayer funds. As 
described in Uzzi (1996), the community logic operates through embedded ties and 
therefore is characterized by a relational network; the market logic and state logic are 
emblematic of arms-length ties (Powell, 2003). In a disaster scenario, embedded ties are 
an asset only to the community logic because they increase trust and social capital. 
According to the state logic, embedded ties can be construed as unethical and 
representing special interests; or, as in the case of the market logic, they can be 
construed as irrational because they can cloud judgement (Uzzi, 1996). Therefore, the 
government must utilize arms-length ties and bureaucratic hierarchy to establish 
transparency—all of which takes time. A planning or economic development 
organization under a community logic, however views times as a tool as they coordinate 
futures into a shared trajectory (Tavory & Eliasoph, 2013); community actors are 
constantly balancing short-term needs of individual community members with the long-
term sustainability of the community, itself, and may use their embedded ties and social 
capital to achieve these goals. 
The market logic, however, sees time as a resource (Das, 1991; Raaijmakers, 
Vermeulen, Meeus, & Zietsma, 2015). Scholars have identified the problem of time 
compression as characteristic to the recovery phase of natural disasters (Olshansky et al., 
2012); whereas in normal time, changes to the built environment, policy decisions, 
information flows, financing, etc. occur incrementally and over longer periods of time, 




timespans. For a business under the market logic, capital resources may be replaced 
incrementally under normal time, but during after a disaster and time compression 
inventory, machinery, and even the building itself might need to be replaced all at once. 
The longer a business waits, the longer the business cannot achieve its basis of strategy 
of profitability, giving a sense of immediacy to its survival. Whereas Hurricane Ike to 
state actors is merely one disaster event of many, businesses in Galveston describe the 
hurricane as permanently splitting their organization of time into “before Ike” and “after 
Ike” —the state does not feel the same temporal pressure the market actors do.  
To summarize, organizations providing aid to businesses after a natural disaster 
are limited in their effectiveness contingent on their association with the recovery ideal 
types. Their timing, characteristics, and lens from which effectiveness and legitimacy is 
viewed by the organization, itself, will vary based on the y-axis attributes identified in 
Table 2. This culminates to makes the assistance more or less attractive to recovering 
businesses and more or less supportive of long-term survival and recovery. 
 
2.3.2. Resource Dependence  
The second perspective I draw upon in this research is resource dependence. 
Resource dependence theory argues that “the key to organizational survival is its ability 
to acquire and maintain resources” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 2). For almost all 
organizations, this requires some interaction with the external environment, as most 
organizations cannot be entirely self-sustaining. As outlined in Section 2.2.1., for-profit 




infrastructure (the physical premise, utilities, telecommunications, etc.). Organizations 
also rely on each other. Businesses specialize and outsource various portions of their 
operations, relying on supply chains to function. The environment, however, is 
undependable: 
 
“The fact that organizations are dependent for survival and success on their 
environments does not, in itself, make their existence problematic. If stable 
supplies were assured from the sources of needed resources, there would be no 
problem. Problems arise not merely because organizations are dependent on their 
environment, but because this environment is not dependable. Environments can 
change, new organizations enter and exit, and the supply of resources becomes 
more or less scarce. When environments change, organizations face the prospect 
either of not surviving or of changing their activities in response to these 
environmental factors.” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 3) 
 
Organizational vulnerability, therefore, stems from the potential of an 
environmental change to create uncertainty in resource acquisition. Organizational 
behavior under this assumption is motivated by the external environment and an 
organization’s desire to exert control over the supply of resources. Often this involves 
strategic positioning in relation to the dependence of other firms, as an organization 
upon whom a large number of organizations rely on is better-off than an organization 




(2003) offer three factors determining the dependence of one organization on another: 1) 
the criticality of the resource to the organizations operation and survival; 2) the second is 
the amount of discretion the organization with the resource has in its allocation and use; 
and 3) the number of alternatives and/or the extent of control of the resource holding 
organization (p. 45-46). 
This has several implications for this research, notably how resource dependence 
shapes cross-scale dynamics after a disaster. After a disaster event, the environment is 
abruptly changed. Businesses, households, and infrastructure are often extensively 
damaged, creating a scarcity in labor, capital, and utility resources among others. 
Telecommunications disruptions can limit the flow of information and knowledge 
becomes a limited resource. Likely, existing resource dependencies within organizations 
are disrupted if a critical number of partners are within the disaster area. Resource 
dependence, therefore, becomes a spatial as well as conceptual phenomenon (Zhang et 
al., 2009). This becomes an issue for organizations under the community logic in 
particular. Recalling Table 2, the geography of the community logic is local, the market 
is global, and the state is national. Because of the local impact of the disaster, 
community organizations may become dependent on—or more dependent—on market 
and state organizations.  
I compare this idea against the three determinants of resource dependence, using 
the example of capital. Capital, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, is critical for an 
organization’s operation and survival. Also touched on in previous sections, federal 




how disaster recovery capital is used. The red tape and high oversight are well-
documented criticisms of federal programs for disaster recovery (Furlong & Scheberle, 
1998). To look at it theoretically, Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) established one of the 
earliest models of the environment as a resource controller (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 
2013). In their paper, a poor bargaining position was a precursor or potential determinant 
of dependence. Consider the observation of Olshansky, Hopkins, and Johnson (2012): 
 
“Time compression affects power relationships at many levels. Consider the 
seeking of reconstruction funding... In order to persuade others to provide that 
funding, the disaster victims need to present an estimate of their financial needs 
and a plan that demonstrates that they will spend the funds wisely. The funding 
entity—whether a bank, insurance company, national government, or 
international aid agency—will provide the funds, but subject to conditions 
negotiated between the two parties. The disaster victims have the weak 
negotiating position, because, due to time compression, they need to start 
receiving funds as quickly as possible. Paradoxically, the conditions of receiving 
the external funding usually include promises of transparency and accountability, 
which can slow the flow of funds over time, even if initiated quickly.” (122)  
 
The first part of this statement corroborates the concepts identified Lawrence, 
Winn, and Jennings (2001), where negotiation abets slower temporal pace and disaster 




research, therefore adds a logic dimension to motivate the paradox identified by 
Olshansky, Hopkins, and Johnson (2012, 122). Referring back to Table 2, values and 
perceptions of time for each logic, therefore, lend themselves to particular temporal 
orientations during recovery:  the market leans towards a present- or near-future 
orientation, the state is distant-future oriented, and the community balances the two. 
Relenting negotiating power defaults to the logic of the state and consequently, resource 
dependence.  
Lastly, resource dependence is also subject to the number of alternatives and/or 
the extent of control of the resource holding organization. Until now, I have ignored the 
potential for resource dependence on the market. Indeed, private insurance greatly 
exceeds federal payout after disasters (Lindsay, 2010). However, the decision to buy 
insurance is made prior to the disaster and the resulting resource dependence. The 
market’s role as a recovery, not mitigation, entity takes the form of private loans as 
discussed in Section 2.3.1. Because the state does not require profit, recovery assistance 
takes the form of grants or low-interest loans. This gives the state control over the 
resource because their form of capital is more desirable than market loans, whose rates 
would be higher to generate profit. The use of these perspectives, particularly 
institutional logics and resource dependence, supports the findings of the empirical 
literature. When it comes to critical inputs, it is not simply the amount of the resource 
but also the characteristics of that resource. 
To summarize, disasters disrupt the existing environment, which consists of 




recovery logics, organizations under the community logic are more likely to become 
dependent on external partners under the state and market logics. Federal assistance, 
therefore, has consequences for long-term organizational survival thereby justifying 





3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Taking the literature and theoretical perspectives together, I use this section to 
derive the hypotheses to be tested. The literature review first used the empirical literature 
on businesses and disasters to identify factors influencing business performance. This 
review showed that business performance is influenced by external factors that are to 
some extent outside of the business’s control, internal factors including characteristics of 
the business and factors within its direct control, the characteristics of the hazard itself, 
and provision of and characteristics of assistance to the business.  
To illustrate, consider the discussion from Zhang et al. (2009) where businesses, 
as well as their suppliers and customers, can be inside or outside the disaster area. 
Businesses can be impacted by their own personal damage (internal characteristics and 
hazard characteristics, e.g. capital asset vulnerability), but also impacted by customer or 
supplier interruption if those inputs are inside the disaster area (external factors). I build 
upon their work to include assistance organizations and the institutional logics at a 










Figure 1 Business Linkages as Resource Dependences in the Institutional Logic 
Context. 
 
Like Zhang et al. (2009) illustrated, businesses can be inside or outside the 
disaster area and linked with businesses and households inside or outside the disaster 
area (pg. 41). Businesses also have some blend of the market and community logics, 
with one being the predominant logic after a disaster.  The connections between 
businesses and households are resource dependencies. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, 
disasters disproportionately affect businesses in the community logic due to the 
geographic distance category on its y-axis; however, businesses can be in the geographic 
community and still be dominated by the market logic. Businesses in general, however, 
see their resource networks disrupted by the disaster impact which changes their 
resource dependencies. The lines connecting the businesses and households become 








Figure 2 Environmental Response to Disasters. 
 
Organizations under the state logic, due to their root metaphor, feel an obligation 
to assist impacted communities through welfare capitalism. Some businesses are 
approved for loans from the SBA, for example. Businesses, through the SBA, can be 
approved for loans for direct (e.g. physical) and indirect (e.g. interruption) damage as a 
result of the disaster. Households may also receive loans from the SBA or through 
individual assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. For businesses, 
however, the empirical literature has suggested that loans may not be and effective form 
of assistance to capital-vulnerable businesses (Dahlhamer, 1998) and that businesses 




Therefore, I consider the reciprocation of the business as separate decision. The 
decisions made by individual businesses are represented by Figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 3 Business Response to Disasters. 
 
Businesses may choose to become dependent on the state in lieu of their previous 
resource networks (X1).  Businesses may also choose to move and establish different 
resource networks (X2), or stay in place and repair their previous resource networks (X3). 
This can be facilitated by, hindered by, or irrelevant to their relationship with the state. 
Where a business moves, however, can indicate their dominant logic (i.e. community or 
market). In addition, through moving creates uncertainty, staying in place may also hurt 




The last step is to include the temporal element: combining Figures 1-3 creates a 
process model of recovery. To reiterate, the research questions posed at the beginning of 
this dissertations were: 
 
Research Question 1. Which businesses benefit from the SBA loan program? 
Research Question 1.1. What determines loan amount? 
Research Question 1.2. Which businesses are more likely to use SBA 
loans in recovery? 
Research Question 2. Do SBA loans improve survival probabilities in the long 
term? 
 








The process model illustrates how disasters affect the individual business as well 
as the environment. Disasters changes resource dependencies and thereby how the 
business interacts with its environment. Considering this new disaster-impacted 
environment and resource dependence landscape, the environment may respond with 
assistance (Research Question 1.1) and businesses may respond by accepting this 
assistance (Research Question 1.2). These decisions, controlling for resource 
dependence, are influenced by institutional logics. Accepting assistance (Research 
Question 2), then, potentially affects survival probabilities.  
From here, I re-introduce the empirical factors introduced by the literature review 
and generate specific hypotheses. The final conceptual framework, Figure 5, blends the 
performance model in the literature review, as well as the theoretical conceptualizations 
in this chapter. Extending from Figure 4, it illustrates the relationship between the 
theories and empirical factors of business performance, and how they relate to long-term 
recovery. It also shows more nuance in how the various theoretical perspectives work 






Figure 5 Conceptual Model. 
 
Beginning from the left side of the model, I again illustrate how the disaster 
event affects the environment and the business in the context of post-disaster resource 
dependence as illustrated in the previous Figures 1-3. However, I now include the 
performance factors identified in the business disaster literature, such as critical inputs 
and external factors (see Section 2.2.1. and 2.2.3., respectively), as characteristics or 
determinants of resource dependence after a disaster event. This means that businesses 
are impacted by disasters and vulnerable post-disaster due to the disruption to their 
resource availability as well as the business characteristics that affect their capacity to 
recuperate those resources and connections. For businesses that are unable to re-establish 
their resource connection may draw from external sources. The SBA, however, is an 
organization that provides such assistance; I explore the motivation and action of the 




the resources, also have more discretion with how the resource is utilized. SBA is 
grounded in the state logic meaning its economic system is welfare capitalism. In that 
sense it’s blending the ideals of the state and community, where assistance is defensible 
philanthropy—the state provides assistance, but the assistance must be paid back, the 
assistance is loans, but the interest rate is low, etc. However, I discussed that because of 
the nature of their perception of time, the community relinquishes its bargaining position 
after disasters. A foreseeable consequence would then be that the SBA would prioritize 
repayment ability rather than need. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The larger the business, the more likely it will be approved for 
higher loan amounts. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The older the business, the more likely it will be approved for 
higher loan amounts. 
 
In addition, Olshansky et al. (2012, p. 176) suggest that disaster time 
compression affects power relationships where disaster victims have a weak negotiating 
position with aid providers because of their need to receive funds quickly. This 
corroborates the ideas of Lawrence, Winn, and Jennings (2001), where negotiation abets 
slower temporal pace and disaster victims therefore respond by relinquishing their power 
and agency to hasten the process. Relenting negotiating power defaults to the logic of the 




Hypothesis 3. Deliberation time has a positive relationship with loan amount. 
 
Businesses also lean toward a dominant logic, which affects their characteristics. 
For example, a business under the community logic may choose to remain small in the 
face of market pressures because it wishes to remain a community business. I also 
argued that organizations under the community logic, due to their geographic distance, 
are more likely to become dependent on external partners under the state and market 
logics such as the SBA. This also means that businesses who are less centered in the 
community logic and more market-driven will be less dependent. Research Question 1.2 
explores the motivations behind why a business ultimately chose to take or reject a loan 
after being approved for it. Following the theory, one might expect that businesses that 
are more centered in the community logic are more likely to accept SBA loans. 
Businesses who have remained small as they age may indicate a rejection of market 
pressures, and are more likely to follow a community logic. Conversely, corporations—
because of their obligation to shareholders—are more likely to follow a market logic.  
Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Businesses that are smaller and older are more likely to accept 
SBA loans. 
 





Additionally, one existing theory of why assistance may be ineffective is the 
additional indebtedness from assistance such as SBA loans hindering recovery 
(Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1998). I hypothesize that higher levels of damage and higher 
approval amounts make taking a loan riskier in terms of payback ability and less 
attractive to a business.  Research Question 1.2, by examining business decision-making 
in terms of establishing a relationship with the SBA, includes whether businesses are 
sensitive to this potential debt burden. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Businesses with higher damage are less likely to choose 
disbursement. 
 
Hypothesis 7. Businesses approved for higher loan amounts are less likely to 
choose disbursement. 
 
Also stemming from the empirical business and disaster literature is the 
importance of capital in business disaster recovery (Zhang et al., 2009). Capital is clearly 
an important factor in business survival and recovery after disaster events since all 
businesses must be profitable in order to survive, but the literature is mixed on the role 
of assistance programs as a source of capital. Research Question 2 looks at whether SBA 
loans affect survival probabilities in the long term; in other words, can they successfully 
be substituted for previous resource linkages. Using a different methodology aimed at 




potentially confounding variables, may give more clarity (Pearce, 2016). This creates 
groups of businesses whose difference can be predominantly explained by loan status. 
Given the new methodology, I propose:  
 





4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This chapter then moves the discussion to the methodology that will be used to 
answer the research questions and test the hypotheses; Namely, the research context, 
data sources and collection, analytical method, and data reliability and validity will be 
elaborated on in detail. 
 
4.1. Research Context 
This research uses the case of Galveston, TX after Hurricane Ike to examine the 
influence of loans on long-term business outcomes. Hurricane Ike made landfall in 
Galveston, TX on September 13, 2008 as a Category 2 Hurricane (FEMA, 2009). Storm 
surge levels on the island reached up to 20 feet during high tide, with 110 mph sustained 
winds (FEMA, 2009). As of 2018, Hurricane Ike has remained the sixth-costliest 
hurricane in U.S. history, with the National Hurricane Center estimating that it caused 
approximately $30 billion in damages (NHC, 2018). Figure 6 illustrates the track of 
















































Hurricane Ike was devastating to the business community. In the initial impact 
report, FEMA cites impact estimates from the Houston-Galveston Area Council that 
claimed that, even excluding some of the more severely impacted areas such as 
Galveston Island, “more than 53,000 employees were put out of work; more than 3,800 
businesses were interrupted; and more than 18,000 businesses were damaged in 
Galveston County” (FEMA, 2009) (p.34). On the island itself, it was estimated that 75-
80 percent of the 2,500 businesses on Galveston Island were severely damaged as a 
result of the storm (IEDC & BCLC, 2009, p. 6). Hurricane Ike is an ideal event to 
examine long-term recovery of businesses due to the scale of the impact as well as the 
timing of the event. This research has been conducted almost ten years since the 
hurricane. 
The SBA Disaster Loan Program, as illustrated by the literature review in Section 
2.1, is the largest and oldest program available to businesses after a disaster and 
provided the bulk of non-insurance recovery assistance to businesses in Galveston. The 
SBA offers two types of recovery assistance, disaster assistance loans and economic 
injury loans to cover both physical damage and business interruption (SBA; SBA). A 
































Up to $2 
mil. 
Private or non-profit 
business located 
within a declared 
disaster area 











4% Up to 
30 
years 






For working capital 
 
The SBA’s disaster assistance loans are similar to traditional, private sector loans 
but with a set low-interest rate. The SBA Disaster Loan Program is annually budgeted 
and does not rely on supplemental appropriations from Congress like other forms of 
disaster relief; it also deals directly from the federal level to the individual business and 
has its own loan monitoring and processing centers. This program is stable and 
independent, and it is therefore unsurprising that the SBA is considered a primary 
agency responsible for the Economic Recovery Support Function in FEMA’s National 
Disaster Recovery Framework (FEMA, 2011). This research focuses on the role of these 
loans in long-term business recovery and survival since it is the largest, most consistent, 




This research makes use of both secondary and primary data to get the necessary 




wind damage information, and operational status of the businesses for this study. In 
general, the research will make use of two samples. The first sample consists of all 
eligible businesses in Galveston County that were approved for an SBA loan, or the 
treatment group, which will be used for Research Question 1.1 and Research Question 
1.2; the second is a database of businesses that did not receive a loan which serves as a 
control group when exploring Research Question 2.  
 
4.2.1. Secondary Data 
The bulk of the data used in this research comes from secondary sources. I use 
data from the SBA, ReferenceUSA, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, U.S. Census, 
and data created by other researchers to generate my sample and track business 
outcomes. 
Loan information at the individual business level was provided directly from the 
SBA through three separate Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests in 2016 and 
2017.  The resulting dataset includes information for every business that was approved 
for and received a loan after Hurricane Ike in Galveston County.  Specific variables 
include the applicant and their mailing address, the damaged property address, number 
of employees at the business, business sector (North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) five-digit code as well as applicant write-in description), organization 
type, and loan characteristics (term, interest rate, amount, and disbursal timing and 
amount). There were 555 businesses included in the database. Although I also requested 




unable to provide that information. I did, however, receive a summary of denial and 
withdrawal codes for Galveston County that I have provided in Appendix A. A total of 
1,177 businesses (including non-profits) were denied an SBA loan. The two most 
common reasons for denial were unsatisfactory credit (622 denial codes) and lack of 
repayment ability (485 denial codes).  Some businesses (448) withdrew their 
applications. The most common reason for withdrawal was that the requested 
information was not furnished (158 withdrawal codes). This likely is capturing 
businesses that abandoned the application process. 
Some cleaning also had to be done to the SBA database. Five businesses had 
damaged property addresses outside of Galveston County although the county field said 
“Galveston,” which I believe was just a data entry error. Additionally, upon closer 
inspection of the remaining 550 businesses that were in the SBA database, I noticed that 
almost half the businesses were in the real estate sector (NAICS two-digit code 53). 
Because the dataset included write-in descriptions of the sector, it was possible to see 
that many of the business loans were for vacation home properties. This warranted a 
closer inspection of businesses in the real estate sector. A breakdown of Sector 53 with 



















531110 Lessors of Residential 
Buildings and Dwellings 
Beach House Rental 1 2.7 228 





Property to Medical 
Clinic) 
3.2 5.7 21 
531190 Lessors of Other Real 
Estate Property 
Rental of Covered 
boat Storage 
0.8 1 4 
531210 Offices of Real Estate 
Agents and Brokers 
Real Estate 3.1 6.6 7 





2.3 2.5 3 
531390 Other Activities Related 




0 0 3 
532120 Truck, Utility Trailer, and 
RV (Recreational 
Vehicle) Rental and 
Leasing 
Mobile Home and 
Travel Trailer 
0 0 1 
532292 Recreational Goods 
Rental 
Golf Cart Rentals 2.5 0.7 2 
532299 All Other Consumer 
Goods Rental 
Music Equipment for 
Rent 
2 0 1 
533110 Lessors of Nonfinancial 
Intangible Assets (except 
Copyrighted Works) 
Rental Houses 0 0 1 
Total     1.26 3.15 271 
 





















531110 6 3 11 4 204 228 
531120 3 3 3 0 12 21 
531190 0 0 2 0 2 4 
531210 4 0 0 0 3 7 
531311 0 0 1 0 2 3 
531390 0 0 2 1 0 3 
532120 1 0 0 0 0 1 
532292 1 0 0 0 1 2 
532299 0 0 0 0 1 1 
533110 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 15 6 19 5 226 271 
 
From the two tables, it’s likely that Sector 531110 and 522110 are mostly 
vacation homes, which is supported by the fact that the vast majority are owned by sole 
proprietors. Galveston Island in particular has a large number of seasonal properties. 
These businesses were excluded from this research because they are a unique type of 
business and do not behave like other for-profit businesses. Also, owners of commercial 
properties—from whom another business might rent space—received SBA loans and are 
represented by Sector 531120 and 531190. These were excluded because of the 
ambiguity in assigning these types of businesses a status like “open” or “closed”—this 
would not be measuring the function of the business, but likely the restoration of the 
structure since the damaged property address is the rental property, which I believe 
makes it incompatible with the rest of the observations and intention of the analysis.  
Real estate brokers and agents were included in the analysis, so the sector is represented; 
the cells highlighted in Table 4 all remained eligible for analysis and were not excluded. 




were excluded from the analysis as this research is concerned with for-profit businesses. 
The final count of eligible businesses in the dataset was 262. These businesses make up 
the treated business dataset, the method for which will be described in Section 4.3.1. 
These treated businesses will then be matched with control businesses (see 
Section 4.3.2.1). This requires a database of the business population in Galveston 
County at the individual business level. Two frequently-used databases are 
ReferenceUSA and Dun & Bradstreet. ReferenceUSA is a database provided by 
InfoGroup. Both databases are compiled from a large range of sources (ReferenceUSA 
claims 5,000 public sources and Dun & Bradstreet claims 30,000) and are continuously 
updated (Dun & Bradstreet; ReferenceUSA). ReferenceUSA businesses can be separated 
by whether or not they have ben are verified through telephone calls, and Dun & 
Bradstreet also advertises machine and manual quality checks (Dun & Bradstreet; 
ReferenceUSA).  The verified dataset downloaded from the ReferenceUSA website had 
11,479 businesses and the dataset purchased by Dun & Bradstreet contained 10,614 
businesses. Both databases contain business information such as sales, branch status, 
employment, female ownership, and general contact information.  
To determine which database to use, the databases were compared to the SBA 
database for quality, since the quality of SBA data is likely to be very high and 
theoretically the businesses in the SBA database should exist in both ReferenceUSA and 
Dun & Bradstreet databases. I matched the SBA dataset with both datasets by hand; to 
be considered a match, the ReferenceUSA/Dun & Bradstreet business and the SBA 




name, damaged property address, and sector description. Of the 550 businesses, 173 
could be found in the ReferenceUSA database, and 150 could be found in Dun & 
Bradstreet. I also checked the quality of the information. I compared employment and 
sector information provided to the SBA to the employment and sector information in 
ReferenceUSA and Dun & Bradstreet. The ReferenceUSA database was off by an 
average of 4.64 employees (maximum difference of 50) and Dun & Bradstreet was off 
by an average of 5.01 employees (maximum difference of 36). In terms of sector, 
ReferenceUSA matched the 6-digit NAICS code of the SBA database 46 percent of the 
time (70 percent when using the 2-digit sector) and Dun & Bradstreet matched 42 
percent of the time (69 percent on the 2-digit sector). Although it still contains error, 
ReferenceUSA outperformed Dun & Bradstreet on all the metrics and was used for the 
control database in this research.  
Information on estimated loss was also requested from the SBA, but the 
information was withheld. Therefore, to estimate the severity of damage, businesses 
needed to be assigned damage information. This research uses both surge and wind 
information that was spatially joined to businesses in both the treatment and control 
databases using GIS. The wind speed data is a shapefile that contains a high density or 
“mesh” of points with wind speed information provided by Bret Webb, Department of 
Civil Engineering, University of South Alabama. The wind field data was part of 
meteorological forcing information used to create a hindcast simulation of Hurricane 
Ike; the meteorological forcing was created by Oceanweather Inc. and obtained through 




Observing System (IOOS)‐funded Coastal Inundation Modeling Testbed (COMT) 
(Integrated Ocean Observing System; Oceanweather Inc.).  
Two different data sources were used for flood depth information. The first is a 
shapefile of various polygons of flood depth ranges provided by Wesley Highfield, 
Department of Marine Sciences, Texas A&M University Galveston and developed by 
the Harris County Flood Control District. Extent and depth information is based on 
LiDAR elevation with surge data provided by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), Louisiana State University Sea Grant, Harris County Flood Control 
District, Galveston County, the United States Geological Survey, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration and Calcasieu Parish (Harris County Flood Control 
District). Business point data was intersected with the polygon to recorded flood depth 
range. The polygon data were in the matching and treatment-control group analysis 1) 
due to their natural coarsening, which lends well to the matching methodology to be 
described in Section 4.3.2.1, and 2) because the data are grounded in observational data 
and have been used in previous studies on Hurricane Ike (Xiao & Peacock, 2014). 
However, for the analyses that use only the treated business group, I use the flood depth 
information generated by the Advanced Circulation (ADCIRC) and Simulating Waves 
Nearshore (SWAN) hydrodynamic models used to simulate Hurricane Ike. The 
simulated flood information was a raster file from which point values were taken for 
each business. These flood depths are highly correlated with the polygon flood depths 
(pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.85 (p>.001) and allow for more precise flood depth 




suggestion of the data providers, since the wind data and flood data are closely related 
(the wind field was part of the meteorological forcing for the surge model). More detail 
on the relationship between the two flood variables can be found in Appendix B.  
Lastly, for area characteristics, I used block group data from the 2000 U.S. 
Decennial Census which was spatially joined to the business. Dependent variable 
information—whether the business was open or closed—was gathered through primary 
data collection with some assistance from permit information provided by the Texas 
Comptroller of Public Accounts, since businesses must be registered with the state of 
Texas for sales tax and franchise tax purposes. This will be discussed more in the 
following section. 
 
4.2.2. Primary Data and Data Collection 
The major dependent variable of this study, business survival, required primary 
data collection. The protocol for determining the status of each business consisted of five 
stages: a preliminary search, phone calls, in-person visits, permit search, and confirming 
closure.  Data collection was done between August and October of 2017.  
 The first stage, preliminary search, was done prior to field visits to get an initial 
sense of the status of each business based on an internet search. Each business was 
searched by name to see if there was a current website, Google My Business Listing, or 
other social media presence. The business address was also entered into Google Maps 
and examined in Google Street View to see if the signage matched the business 




as address and phone number was cross-checked for accuracy and to determine if a 
business had moved. Each business was coded based on the certainty of the information, 
for example a business was coded with a “1” if the status of the business could be 
determined without a doubt based on the online information. This was rare and only 
occurred in cases when a business posted on its social media within the last month and 
had a current website or had a statement on its website that the business had closed. A 
business was coded as a “2” if it seemed like the business was open or closed with a 
minor degree of certainty—for example had the same name on Google Street View in the 
same year and a website that did not have regularly updates, or was reported closed by 
Yelp or Google. Businesses coded with a “3” had statuses that were unable to be 
determined externally, for example some businesses could not be found on Google Street 
View, had no website, or the information seemed out of date.  
 Businesses coded as a “2” or “3” proceeded to the phone call stage. All business 
that had a record in the ReferenceUSA database had a phone number which was verified 
during Stage 1. If a business was not in ReferenceUSA, sometimes a phone number was 
available for the business. Phone calls were made to each business that had a phone 
number to ask whether or not the business was open and if the business answered, it was 
coded as a “1.” Businesses that were suspected open and had an answering machine that 
matched the record of the business were re-coded or remained as “2.” Businesses that 
had a non-working number and were suspected closed were also re-coded or coded as a 




 Businesses that remained coded as a “2” or “3” were then visited in person. The 
geocoded locations used to determine flood depth and wind speed were transferred to 
Google MyMaps to assist data collection as the record could be both easily navigated to 
as well as be updated in the field. In eight cases, the geocoding of the business was 
incorrect even if the address was correct and the business had not relocated. These 
businesses had their flood depth and wind speed updated to match the correct location. 
Businesses that were open when visited were coded as a “1.” If a business was not at the 
location, a neighboring business or the current business was asked if they knew the 
status of the business. In some cases, the status of the business could still not be 
determined by in-person visits due to safety issues, particularly when the business was 
home-based. Homes were not visited if there was a “No Trespassing” sign, had an 
unchained dog, or was an apartment building with no access. These businesses kept their 
original coding.  
 As a final method of determining the status of the business, I used the Franchise 
Tax (Taxable Entity) Search as well as the Sales Taxpayer Search provided by the Texas 
Comptroller of Public Accounts to search for the remaining businesses coded as a “2” or 
“3” (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts; Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts). 
Once this was complete, businesses that were still coded as a “2” (e.g. they could not be 
found in either database) were assigned an operating status based on the most likely 
status of the business according to the evidence. Because there were five stages of data 
collection, there was usually enough evidence to indicate a likely status. In addition, the 




operation, as a business must have some availability or presence in order to function. 
Businesses still coded as a “3,” which in this case meant there was no record of the 
business, were excluded from the analysis.  There were 18 businesses still coded as “3” 
at the time of the analysis. Six of those eight businesses claimed money for a residential 
property— which they listed as a real estate property or new home construction—with 
the actual real estate businesses unable to be located. These most likely should have been 
excluded during the cleaning of the SBA data. The remaining 12 businesses simply 
could not be reached because no business name or number could be found aside from the 
applicant’s own name and the house was inaccessible due to signage or safety reasons. 
One business requested to not be included in the study. 
This research was very sensitive in declaring a true business closure. To ensure 
data quality, the final step in the data collection process was to verify closure status both 
to make sure the business had not simply moved, as well as try to reduce survivor bias in 
this research since open businesses are easier to determine (Schrank, Marshall, Hall-
Phillips, Wiatt, & Jones, 2013). Closed businesses were searched for the Sales Taxpayer 
Search, the Taxable Entity Search, and in the 2017 ReferenceUSA database. The Sales 
Taxpayer Search and ReferenceUSA indicate whether a business has moved or re-
opened in a new location, which was recorded as part of the data collection. Every 
business that was coded as had their evidence reviewed again as well as had an 
additional internet search done to ensure the data was accurate. This process resulted in 




or outside its original city, and whether it downsized or moved all operations to an 
existing location.1 
Lastly, during data collection, adjustment needed to be made at various points 
due to the error in the ReferenceUSA database. When cleaning the matched businesses, 
18 controls needed to be substituted for another business due to having no physical 
address even though there were coordinates attached to the business (n=3), not being an 
eligible business such as vending machines, ATM’s, etc. (n=5), or repeat observations 
(n=10). During data collection, an additional 11 controls were replaced with substitutes 
due to not having existing during Hurricane Ike but were still in the 2008 database. To 
substitute controls, businesses in the same strata were randomly selected, mirroring the 
original matching strategy. Three ineligible controls did not have any other businesses in 
their strata, resulting in three matched pairs being excluded from the analysis. 
 
4.3. Analytical Methods 
I employ a variety of analytical methods to answer the research questions. 
Specific estimation details such as variable choice and specific equations for each model 
will be presented in Chapter 5 in concurrence with the model results. However, this 
section will present a broader summary of the analysis techniques used in this research.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Example coding decisions include: bought out (coded as closed), single owners like realtors or hair 




4.3.1. Research Question 1: Treatment Group Analyses 
Many of the research questions can be analyzed using on the treatment sample of 
businesses. Research Question 1, how the SBA functions from the perspective of both 
the provider and the receiver of loans, utilizes descriptive statistics to see how businesses 
that are approved for loans differ from the general business populations. The specific 
sub-questions utilize linear regression and logistic regression to look at what determines 
loan amount (Research Question 1.1) and which businesses chose to accept the loan 
(Research Question 1.2), respectively. With respect to Research Question 1.1, 
Dahlhamer (1994) found that businesses that were likely to be eligible for commercial 
loans were more likely to receive SBA loans, concluding that SBA loans were approved 
based heavily on ability to repay. I extend this analysis to lean amount, examining 
whether damage or repayment ability had a stronger relationship with how much money 
a business was approved for. Because the dependent variable of interest is loan amount 




Where  𝑌 represents the dependent variable, in this case loan amount, 𝐵0 
represents the intercept, 𝐵1 represents the regression or slope coefficient for each 
intendent variable, 𝑋𝑖, and 𝜀 represents the error term. Independent variables include 




 Once a business is approved for a certain loan amount, the business can choose 
whether or not to accept the loan (i.e., the loan is disbursed to them), which is the 
concern of Research Question 1.2.  Because this is a binary choice, I use logistic 
regression to predict whether a business chose to receive the loan. Using the same 
notation and form as the equation above, replacing 𝑌 with P to represent probability and 










] = B0+B1X1+B1X1+…+BnXn+ε   
 
 
4.3.2. Research Questions 2: Treatment-Control Analysis 
To estimate the impact of the SBA loan program on business recovery, or 
Research Question 2, I will use quasi-experimental design to estimate the difference 
between these two groups. Because I want to estimate the effect of a specific treatment, 
but cannot randomly assign the treatment (businesses choose to take a loan), a quasi-
experimental design is appropriate. Creating a control group of businesses that are as 
similar to the businesses that chose to apply for the various programs as possible reduces 
the selection bias. This allows the researchers to be more confident that the effects of the 




Shadish, 2002). For example, Dahlhamer and Tierney (1998) found a negative 
association between aid and recovery, but clarify in the discussion that those businesses 




Matching is a common technique used to emulate experimental design in 
observational data. This is especially useful for disaster research since it’s impossible to 
predict when and where a disaster will be (nor can we create one). Covariates in both the 
treatment and control groups are matched such that the empirical distributions of the two 
groups are more similar (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012).  If the two groups are perfectly 
balanced, controlling for the covariates is no longer necessary and the difference in 
means is the treatment effect; approximately balanced data will still need a model to 
control for the covariates, but the analysis will have less statistical bias and model 
dependence (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007).  
There are two general classes of matching methods: Monotonic Imbalance 
Bounding (MIB) and equal percent bias reducing (EPBR) (King & Nielsen, 2016). Two 
of the most common matching methods, propensity score matching (PSM) and 
Mahalanobis distance matching (MDM), fall under the latter category. MDM uses a 
distance equation to minimize the distance between covariates (King & Nielsen, 2016; 
Xiao & Drucker, 2013). PSM uses logistic regression to estimate the probability of being 




to treatment and control observations with similar propensity scores. Coarsened exact 
matching (CEM), in the Monotonic Imbalance Bounding class, allows the researcher to 
create coarsened “groups” of variables from which an exact match can be found. 
The next natural question is which is of these methods is superior? Iacus et al. (2012) 
identify the major dilemma in matching methods, which is how to best achieve a balance 
between the treated and control groups:  
 
“…in many observational data sets, finding a matching solution that improves 
balance between the treated and control groups is easy for most covariates, but 
the result often leaves balance worse for some other variables at the same time. 
Thus, analysts are left with the nagging worry that all their ‘‘improvements’’ in 
applying matching may actually have increased bias and model dependence.” 
(p.2) 
 
To elaborate, King and Nielsen (2016) discuss the differences in methods in 
relation to the research designs they emulate. MDM and CEM approximate a fully 
blocked experimental design (treated and control groups blocked on the observed 
covariates) because the parameters can be adjusted to create exact matches; PSM 
approximates a completely randomized experimental design (random with respect to the 
covariates). King and Nielsen (2016) cite several sources supporting the notion that “a 
fully blocked randomized experimental design has more power, more efficiency, lower 




perspective here — lower model dependence and thus less bias” (p. 12). The logic then 
transfers to strategies such as MDM and CEM versus PSM (King & Nielsen, 2016).   
The authors then use both simulations and tests of published data to examine the 
effects of each matching technique on reducing imbalance. In the first simulation, the 
authors examined whether MDM and PSM pruned in the “correct order” (i.e. starting 
from the highest level of imbalance to the lowest) and if they could distinguish between 
randomized experimental observations and a matched pair randomized experiment—
PSM could not recover the matched pair experiment although MDM could (p. 15).  
Secondly, the authors examine the effect of continued matching which showed that 
MDM continued to reduce model dependence whereas PSM eventually began to 
introduce more model dependence (p. 20) because it attempts to match globally instead 
of locally.  This is further supported when using data from previously published studies: 
as more data is pruned (i.e., the worst score matches are dropped), CEM and MDM trend 
downward, whereas PSM trends upwards (King & Nielsen, 2016). 
There are several conclusions from this analysis. First, is that bias can be 
minimized through any three of these methods if done correctly. Propensity score is 
efficient up to the point when randomization is approximated (p. 20). Secondly, 
propensity score can be done through several matching algorithms (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008) and the analysis done by King and Nielsen (2016) was done using a 
specific type of propensity score matching (i.e. one-to-one greedy matching). However, 
the authors believe the issues with propensity score matching will arise regardless of 




can emulate an arguably superior experimental design (blocked) and will improve with 
continued pruning; CEM, specifically, can specify a desired level of imbalanced ex-ante. 
Regardless of matching technique, the most important take-away is the importance of 
testing and report covariate imbalance before and after matching to ensure that bias and 
model dependence are being reduced—a simple t-test will be insufficient (Iacus et al., 
2012). These matching techniques and covariate imbalance reports can all be done 
through STATA, which is the primary analytic software used in this research (King, 
Blackwell, Iacus, & Porro, 2010; Leuven & Sianesi). 
For this research, I will match using CEM to achieve a quasi-experimental 
design. Using CEM matching will allow me to control for selection bias and reduce 
model dependence by minimizing covariate imbalance (King & Nielsen, 2016). Many of 
my variables of interest are categorical which lend themselves well to a stratification 
approach. Additionally, there is some error in the database that will be used to find the 
controls, so having coarsened parameters will allow for the range of error to be included 
in the matching process. 
As mentioned, CEM is characterized by temporarily “coarsening” data so exact 
matches can be found (for example, instead of exact number of employees, matching on 
categories such as 0-5, 5-10, 10-20, etc.). Strata are created that include the same 
coarsened values of the variables of interest. If there are more treated units than controls 
within a stratum or vice versa, a weight is assigned to balance the sample (however, to 




include at least one control and one treatment observation will be dropped (assigned a 
weight of zero). 
As discussed in Section 2.1, two studies looked at the factors influencing whether 
a business applied for and received an SBA loan (Dahlhamer, 1994; Josephson & 
Marshall, 2016). Table 6 summarizes these variables and whether or not they were able 




















Table 6 Variables Affecting Whether or Not a Business Applies for and Receives 
an SBA Loan 







Location Applied for a loan: - 
Received a loan: D 
S Damage limits the 
location of matches, but 
this research does not 
include a spatial variable 
 Damage Applied for a loan: JM 
Received a loan: JM 
Y Flood depth categories 
 Coastal Applied for a loan: JM 
Received a loan: - 
S This research controls 
for flooding which 
primarily occurred near 
the coast, but a coastal-




Age Applied for a loan: - 
Received a loan: D 
N Not provided at owner 
level 
 Gender Applied for a loan: JM 
Received a loan: JM 
Y This is provided by 
ReferenceUSA 
 Income Applied for a loan: JM 
Received a loan: JM 
S Not provided at owner 
level, but this research 
has at least one financial 
variable 
 Education Applied for a loan: - 
Received a loan: JM 
N Not provided at owner 
level 
 Stress Applied for a loan: JM 
Received a loan: - 
N Not provided at owner 
level 
 Race Applied for a loan: - 
Received a loan: JM 






Applied for a loan: JM 
Received a loan: - 
Y This is provided by 
ReferenceUSA 
 Revenue Applied for a loan: JM 
Received a loan: JM 
S Business sales volumes 
are provided by 
ReferenceUSA 
 Number of 
employees 
Applied for a loan: - 
Received a loan: JM 
Y This is provided by 
ReferenceUSA and the 
SBA data 
 Years in 
operation 
Applied for a loan: - 
Received a loan: D, JM 
N This is provided in the 
SBA data, but mostly 
missing in the 
ReferenceUSA data (not 
reliable) 
 Owned (vs. 
rented) 
Applied for a loan: - 
Received a loan: D 
S This research only 
controls for whether the 




Table 6 (continued) 











Applied for a loan: - 
Received a loan: D 
S This research controls 
for branches, which may 
have additional sources 
of assistance and 
resources 
 Insurance Applied for a loan: JM 
Received a loan: JM 
N Not provided; this 
information was 
requested from FEMA in 
2016 but is still being 
processed/gathered 
1D= Dalhhamer (1994), JM= Josephson & Marshall (2016)  
2Y=Yes, N=No, S=Somewhat 
 
Also shown in Table 6, this research is able to match businesses on damage, 
business characteristics, and some owner and financial characteristics. This controls for 
many of the variables influencing whether or not a business applies for or receives an 
SBA loan. This research, because it relies on secondary data for matching, does not have 
detailed information on owner or manager demographics. However, those owner 
characteristics that were most important (i.e. significant predictors of both application 
and loan receipt) were at least partially controlled for. I also match on business sector to 
try and capture some of the missing variability between businesses. Although I don’t 
have a good measure for repayment ability, employment size is a good indication of a 
business’ financial situation. Combined with the business sector, it can serve as a good 
measure of where the business is amongst its peers as this will match the business to a 
similar-sized business. 
 For the mechanics of the matching, I sector was coarsened to two-digit NAICS 




feet. and over six feet, which is slightly more coarse than the categories already in the 
data (Harris County Flood Control District); wind speed was coarsened to the damage 
categories in the Beaufort Wind Scale; and employment was coarsened to less than five 
employees, 5-10 employees, 10-25 employees, 25-50 employees, 50-100 employees, and 
over 100 employees. Employment was coarsened to at least groups of five because 
applicant-reported employment numbers and ReferenceUSA-reported employment 
numbers were off by an average of 4.64 people. Sales was coarsened to less than $500K, 
between $500K and $1mil., between $1mil. and $2.5mil, between $2.5mil. and 5mil., 
between $5mil. and $10mil., between $10mil. and $20mil. and over $20mil. Lastly, 
businesses were exact matched on branch status, female ownership or management, and 
home business status. 
Deciding on the levels of coarsening was done either on a theoretical basis (e.g., 
wind speed), due to error in the data source (e.g. employment), or by existing data 
groupings (e.g. flood depth and sales), and decisions on variable inclusion in the 
matching process was made based on the literature. However, it could be argued that 
decisions on which matching variables and how to coarsen them can be subjective and 
can introduce bias. Therefore, I have presented a sensitivity analysis, or a more 








4.3.2.2. Matched analysis 
Matched case-control samples violate the assumption of a simple random sample, 
as the probability of selecting one case is not independent of the selection (or not 
selection) of any other case (Menard & Menard, 2010). Therefore, the assumptions for 
simple logistic regression are also violated. One way to address this issue would be to 
create a dummy variable for each of the strata generated by the matching process 
(Menard & Menard, 2010; Pearce, 2016). However, this becomes an issue when strata 
are small (e.g., one case and one control for each stratum), known as a sparse data 
problem. The number of parameters increases at the same, or similar, rate as the sample 
size (Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). For this research, for example, there 
are 109 strata which would require 108 dummy variables for only 282 observations. A 
more efficient approach, if not a required approach, is to use conditional logistic 
regression (Pearce, 2016). Conditional logistics regression groups data by strata and 
calculates the likelihood relative to each group (i.e., uses a conditional likelihood) and is 
often used in case-control studies (Pearce, 2016). Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) provide a 
derivation of the conditional likelihood. However, recently, Kuo, Duan, and Grady 
(2018) examined the differences between unconditional and conditional logistic 
regression models in case-control data. Their paper offers a more functional form of the 
two models citing Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) which I reprint here. The unconditional model 














Where π represents the probability, an example in this research being the 
probability of survival. Xm ={Xm1, Xm2} is a vector of matching variables—variables in 
Xm1 are exactly matched and variables in Xm2 are interval matched—and Xo is a vector of 
unmatched variables to include in the model (Kuo et al., 2018). For this research, Xm1 
might represent whether the business is female-owned, a home business, or a branch, 
Xm2 might represent number of employees, sales, and damage information, and Xo might 
represent area characteristics (census variables). Xe is an exposure variable indicating 
case-control status (in this research, whether or not the business received an SBA loan) 
with S being the id of matching sets; s = i for subjects in the ith matching set for i = 1, 2, 
…, n (Kuo et al., 2018). The β’s, as conventionally defined, are the regression 










xo,   (Kuo et al., 2018, Eq.2) 
 
Where βoi denotes the contribution to the logit of all terms constant within the ith 
matching set (Kuo et al., 2018). In line with the examples provided by Hosmer Jr et al. 
(2013), I use the STATA command CLOGIT to estimate the matched analysis 
(conditional logistic regression).  
Although the matching process is primarily designed to put businesses into 
treatment and control groups based on SBA loan status, this matching can also be used 
to provide evidence for whether moving affects survival since this data was collected. 




matching. For this research design, the matching is done prior to data collection, which 
determines whether the business moved and where. However, this should not be an issue 
for several reasons. The first is that the matching technique in its essence, is matching 
businesses based on potential access to resources, thereby controlling for resource access 
through research design rather than purely in the regression. Adding the moving 
variable, therefore, is effectively answering whether moving is a significant predictor or 
survival controlling for SBA loan status and access to resources. This makes sense 
considering that moving likely does require access to resources. Moving might entail 
establishing or solidifying a new customer base, which would require marketing 
resources, or updating or constructing the building or machinery needed for operation on 
top of the expenses and opportunity costs related to the process of moving.  
Existing research on business mobility after disasters is relatively sparse but 
supports the matching variable choice used in this research. Siodla (2014) looked at firm 
relocations after the 1906 San Fernando earthquake and found that damage and sector 
were important factors in the almost ten-year timespan of their analysis. Although 
technology has changed the way firms chose their locations since 1906, it seems 
reasonable to believe that these decisions will still vary by industry. Wasileski, 
Rodríguez, and Diaz (2011) looked at post-disaster firm relocations after both the Loma 
Prieta earthquake and Hurricane Andrew several years after the event and confirmed the 
importance of sector in whether a business moved. In addition to sector, significant 
variables included building construction type, whether the property was owned, business 




damage. Building construction, in the study conducted by Wasileski et al. (2011) relates 
to structural vulnerability which may be captured by the damage and exposure variables; 
ownership of the property is unfortunately unavailable in the data sources for this 
research but highlights the importance of controlling for resource access and financial 
condition. 
 
4.4. Data Validity and Reliability  
 This section concludes Chapter 4 with a discussion on threats to the reliability 
and validity of the study through the sample and matching process.  
One potential impact on data quality is the incomplete matching when answering 
Research Question 2 and Research Question 3, since not all 262 businesses could be 
matched with a control, as well as the substitutions and additional exclusions made 
during the data collection process. First, as discussed in Section 4.3.1., matching aims to 
reduce the differences between covariates, or covariate imbalance in order to reduce bias 
(King & Nielsen, 2016). Concern with existing matching methods can arise if imbalance 
reduction is not recorded or reported, particularly when finding a matching solution may 
potentially reduce imbalance in some variables while increasing it in others (Stefano 
Maria Iacus, King, & Porro, 2008). I examine the covariate imbalance before and after 
matching using the imbalance measure defined by Stefano Maria Iacus et al. (2008). In 
this measure, variables are discretized (no change to categorical variables and automated 
univariate histogram method for continuous variables) and cross-tabulated (X1 ×  · · ·  × 




recorded and the imbalance measure is the absolute difference across all cell values, 
similar to L1 distance (Iacus et al., 2008, Eq. 5). The imbalance prior to matching in our 
sample is presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Imbalance Before Matching. 
Multivariate L1 distance:  0.88 
Univariate imbalance:       
 L1 Mean Min. 25% 50% 75% Max. 
Flood depth 3.22 0.00 3.00 5.00 2.00 0.00 3.22 
Wind speed 4.69 0.00 1.45 2.85 5.82 -1.57 4.69 
Number of employees -2.88 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 -1530.00 -2.88 
Sales ($100,000) -6.2 0.55 1.3 0.71 2.2 -13000 -6.2 
2-digit NAICS -2.51 11.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -18.00 -2.51 
Female-owned or managed -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 
Home business -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 
Branch 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 
 
The imbalance after matching is presented in Table 8: 
 
Table 8 Imbalance After Matching. 
Multivariate L1 distance:  0.59 
Univariate imbalance:       
 L1 Mean Min. 25% 50% 75% Max. 
Flood depth 0.05 0.18 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wind speed 0.10 0.20 0.00 0.95 0.81 0.37 -0.13 
Number of employees 0.03 -0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -10.00 
Sales ($100,000) -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.56 -0.24 -5.00 -0.05 
2-digit NAICS 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female-owned or managed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Home business 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Branch 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
As illustrated by the tables, the multivariate imbalance was reduced to 0.59 from 
0.88 and all univariate distances were reduced, indicating that the matching procedure 




of some covariates over others which may have been a concern for other matching 
techniques.  
I also examine the differences between the treated businesses that were able to be 
matched, the overlap with ReferenceUSA, and the original 262 treated businesses in 











































11 Logging 9 3.44  2 1.22  1 0.71  -2.22 -2.72 -0.51 
21 Mining 2 0.76  1 0.61  0 0.00  -0.15 -0.76 -0.61 
22 Utilities 0 0.00  0 0.00  0 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
23 Construction 28 10.69  13 7.93  9 6.43  -2.76 -4.26 -1.50 
31-33 Manufacturing 10 3.82  6 3.66  6 4.29  -0.16 0.47 0.63 
42 Wholesale 5 1.91  5 3.05  2 1.43  1.14 -0.48 -1.62 
44-45 Retail 48 18.32  37 22.56  34 24.29  4.24 5.97 1.72 
48-49 Transportation/ 
warehousing 
7 2.67  4 2.44  4 2.86  -0.23 0.19 0.42 
51 Information 1 0.38  0 0.00  0 0.00  -0.38 -0.38 0.00 
52 Finance/insurance 7 2.67  5 3.05  4 2.86  0.38 0.19 -0.19 




30 11.45  18 10.98  16 11.43  -0.47 -0.02 0.45 
55 Management 1 0.38  1 0.61  0 0.00  0.23 -0.38 -0.61 
56 Administration 7 2.67  4 2.44  2 1.43  -0.23 -1.24 -1.01 
61 Educational 
services 
1 0.38  1 0.61  1 0.71  0.23 0.33 0.10 
62 Health care and 
social assistance 
19 7.25  14 8.54  14 10.00  1.28 2.75 1.46 
71 Leisure and 
Hospitality 
11 4.20  5 3.05  5 3.57  -1.15 -0.63 0.52 
72 Accommodation 
and Food Services 
32 12.21  24 14.63  24 17.14  2.42 4.93 2.51 
81 Other services 27 10.31  19 11.59  15 10.71  1.28 0.41 -0.87 
 
Total 262 100  164 100  140 100  - - - 
 
In terms, of sector, the treated businesses that were both able to matched and 
exist in the ReferenceUSA were underrepresented in the real estate businesses and 
construction sectors, and overrepresented in the retail and accommodation/food service 
sectors. However, this is due to the overlap error in the ReferenceUSA data as opposed 




research is more concerned with between-match variance as opposed to overall variance, 
as well as the fact that there is still representation within those sectors. I also present the 
difference in the continuous variable distribution in Table 10: 
 









 One sample  
t-test 
  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  t p 
# of Employees 6.8 10.7  8.5 11.8  8.0 11.8  -0.46 0.65 
Flood Depth (midpoint, ft.) 5.6 3.8  5.2 3.6  5.1 3.6  -0.30 0.77 
Average windspeed (m/s/s) 25.4 7.8  25.2 7.4  25.1 7.0  -1.35 0.18 
Sales N/A N/A  1187.9 1790.1  1008.6 1664.2  -1.28 0.20 
 n=262   n=164   n=140     
 
When comparing the mean of the sample to the treated business population 







This chapter discusses the results of the analyses.  
 
5.1. Which Businesses Benefit from the SBA Loan Program? 
The first analysis looks at how the SBA loan program functioned in Galveston 
after 2008 Hurricane Ike in terms of participation.  According to a report to the U.S. 
Congress, around 22 percent of businesses that applied for an SBA loan after Hurricane 
Ike were approved. Approval rates for SBA business loans ranged between 20 and 50 
percent for similar Hurricane during that time, with Hurricane Katrina’s approval rate 
landing at around 45 percent, Hurricane Irene around 26 percent, and Hurricane Sandy 
around 24 percent (Velázquez, 2013). According to the data in this research, 550 
businesses (including non-profits) were approved for either a physical disaster loan or an 
economic injury loan; 1,042 were denied, yielding an approval rate of closer to 35 
percent. However, excluding nonprofits (n=34) and vacation homes (n=229), the 
approval rate does end up being around 22 percent. A map flooded businesses based on 
the ReferenceUSA data and flood depth from the Harris County Flood Control District is 
presented in Figure 7. A map of SBA-approved businesses is then overlaid on the 













Figure 8 All Businesses in Galveston County and SBA-Approved Businesses. 
 
As illustrated by the maps, there is not a clear, discernable geographic pattern to 
businesses that were approved for an SBA loan, though it does appear that SBA-
approved businesses tend to be in flooded areas. This, of course, makes sense. A 
comparison of businesses that were approved for SBA loans to the Galveston business 
population and Hurricane Ike-flooded businesses is looked at in more depth in Appendix 
D. 
For the remainder of the descriptive statistics, I use the sample selected for this 
study as detailed in Section 4.2.1 (nonprofits, vacation homes, businesses outside of 
Galveston, and other businesses whose status relates more to the restoration of the 




map of these businesses is presented in Figure 9. Businesses that are colored light green 
were approved for a loan but did not accept the loan, whereas those businesses with a 
darker green coloration chose to have loans disbursed. The pattern is not visually clear, 
motivating the need for regression analysis on which businesses chose disbursement. 
 
 
Figure 9 Sample of Businesses Approved for SBA Loans by Disbursement 
Decision. 
 
Additional descriptive statistics relating to the types of businesses that were 
approved for SBA loans, and the characteristics of the loans they were approved for, are 






Table 11 SBA Descriptive Statistics: Continuous Variables. 
Variable Label Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loan Term (years) loanterm 262 17.7 10.4 0.8 30.0 
Approved Loan Amount 
($1000) 
amount 262 142.9 188.7 0.7 1252.6 
Amount Disbursed ($1000) disb_amount 187 128.1 211.3 1.4 2000.0 
Percent disbursed of 
approved 
per_disburse 187 95.6 55.3 3.2 492.4 
Applicant Delay (days after 
Ike loan accepted) 
appdelay 262 88.9 81.0 11.0 479.0 
SBA Delay (days between 
loan accepted and 
approved) 
sbadelay1 262 26.4 15.6 2.0 108.0 
SBA Delay 2 (days 
between loan approved and 
disbursed 
sbadelay2 186 59.2 75.7 7.0 607.0 
Total time to approval delaytotalapp 262 115.2 82.2 25.0 537.0 
Total time to disbursal delaytotaldisb 186 176.2 120.5 42.0 781.0 
Under Current Management 
(years before Ike) 
management 254 10.7 8.7 0.0 41.7 
Age of business (years 
established before Ike) 
age 255 14.0 13.9 0.0 106.8 
Number of employees size 262 6.8 10.7 0.0 60.0 
Flood depth (ft.) flood_dmg 262 5.3 3.5 0.0 17.4 
Average maximum wind 
speed (m/s) 
wind_dmg 262 25.4 7.8 0.0 40.6 
Density (1000 people/mi2) density 262 3.2 3.1 0.0 11.3 
Median household income 
($1000) 












Table 12 SBA Descriptive Statistics: Categorical Variables. 
Variable  Label n % 
Loan Type Physical phys_dummy 244 93% 
 Economic Injury eidl_dummy 18 7% 
Organization Type Corporation corp_dummy 116 43% 
 Limited Partnership lp_dummy 6 2% 
 LLC, LLP, OR LLE llc_dummy 33 12% 
 Partnership part_dummy 2 1% 
 Sole Proprietorship/ 
Individual 
sole_dummy 105 39% 
Home Business Yes homebusiness 71 27% 
Business had money 
disbursed 




man_const 38 15% 
 Retail or Wholesale retail 53 20% 
Interest rate 4% 4per 256 98% 
 8% 8per 6 2% 
 
Businesses that received a loan were an average of 14 years old with an average 
of seven employees. Years of current management was slightly less than the age of the 
business, with current management having run the business for an average of 11 years. 
Corporations made up 43 percent of businesses that were approved for a loan, and 39 
percent were sole proprietors. The average flood depth experienced by the businesses 
was 5.3 feet, and the average (maximum) wind speed was 25 meters per second (or 
approximately 57 miles per hour).  
 Business loans were $143,000 on average, with a minimum of $700 and a 
maximum of two million. Loan terms, or amount of time the business had to pay back 
the loan, were an average of 17.7 years. A majority of loans (93 percent) were physical 
disaster loans with an interest rate of four percent (98 percent). It took an average of 89 
days, or approximately three months, for businesses to get an application into the SBA. 




approved, and another 59 days for the money to be disbursed. Not all businesses chose to 
accept the loan once it was approved—only 187 of the 262 businesses that were 
approved for a loan actually chose to have money disbursed to them. For those 187 
businesses, the entire amount of time since Hurricane Ike it took to receive money was 
176 days, on average.  
Using these 262 businesses, I ran two regressions. To answer what determines 
eligibility for SBA loans (Research Question 1.1), I examined what factors influence the 
amount of money approved to the business. To answer which businesses are more likely 
to use SBA loans in recovery (Research Question 1.2), I examined what made a business 
choose disbursement. 
 
5.1.1. What Determines Loan Amount? 
The first model looked at the variables driving approved loan amounts. Although 
I didn’t have information on loan denials, I could still use loan amounts to test the 
motivations of the loan program. This analysis tested some of the x-axis attributes of the 
recovery ideal types identified in Table 2. SBA assistance takes the form of loans, so 
there is a balance between whether loans should be purely aid-based (loan amounts are 
driven by damage) or if loan amount is based purely on repayment ability. This conflict 
represents the state logic balancing the ideals of the community and the market. 
Olshansky et al. (2012, p. 176) note that post-disaster time compression affects power 
dynamics in that borrows relent their negotiating position in order to receive funds 




repayment ability being positive predictor of loan amounts. Additionally, the state views 
time as legitimacy so longer deliberation times on the side of the SBA are also expected 
to be positively related to loan amount. 
The initial analysis used untransformed loan amounts as the dependent variable 
but the analysis had problems with non-normality in the residuals as well as 
heteroskedasticity. Therefore, the decision was made to use the natural log form of the 
loan amount variable, which improved these diagnostic issues. This process is discussed 
in greater detail in Appendix F. Using the natural log also has benefits in terms of 
interpretation and answering the research because the variables have a potentially 
multiplicative relationship to the dependent variable; for example, a variable that is 
associated with an additional $5,000 approval amount to a business with a $5,000 initial 
approved loan has an arguably different effect than if the businesses had a $500,000 
approved loan initially. Therefore, the variable influence can now be interpreted as a 
percentage rather than unit increase.  
For damage, I use the wind field data and flood depth information used in the 
ADCIRC and SWAN models for Hurricane Ike. This provides flood depth (ft.) and 
maximum wind speed (m/s) experienced by the business. Business characteristics 
include age of the business (years), years the business has been under its current 
management, size of the business (number of employees), sector (specifically whether 
the business is a retail/wholesale business or manufacturing/construction), whether or 
not the damaged property is a residential property (indicating a home business), and 




Decennial Census at the block group level, include median household income ($1,000) 
and density (1000 people per square mile). Lastly, I include loan term (months), loan 
type (whether the loan was economic injury or a physical disaster loan), and approval 
delay (days between Hurricane Ike and application approved by the SBA) as loan 
characteristic variables. The descriptive statistics and variable labels are provided in 
Tables 11 and 12. The full OLS regression, therefore, takes the form: 
 





































In addition to testing the specific hypotheses, I can also look at which variable 
categories have the most explanatory power in the models when it comes to predicting 
loan amounts. This can also shed light on whether the SBA loan program leans more 
towards the market, where loans would resemble private loans, or towards the 
community, where loans would more closely resemble philanthropic assistance. If the 
former, one might expect business characteristics or repayment ability to explain the 
most variance, if the latter, damage might play a larger role.  
The results of the regression analyses are presented in Tables 13 and 14. Models 
1-4 present loan amounts as a function of damage, business characteristics, area 
characteristics, and loan characteristics, shown in Table 13. Model 5 is shown in Table 
14 and is the full model with all variables included. I present the coefficients, the X-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 14 Full Model Predicting Loan Amounts. 
 
Model 1 looks at loan amount as a function of damage. Flood depth is a 
marginally significant predictor of loan amount (p<0.1), where a foot increase in flood 
depth is associated with a four percent increase in loan amount. As damage increases, it 
makes sense that more money is needed to repair and address the damages. Wind 
damage is insignificant, but this result is fairly unsurprising given that Hurricane Ike was 
primarily a flooding event. The F test suggests we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
Variable Coef. Coef.*   S.E.
   Constant 3.258 - 0.389 0.000
Damage
   Flood depth (ft.) 0.038 0.130 0.026 0.069 *
   Average maximum wind speed (m/s) -0.002 -0.014 0.010 0.431
Business Characteristics
   Age (years) 0.016 0.231 0.006 0.004 **
   Length of current management (years) -0.006 -0.052 0.010 0.273
   Number of employees 0.019 0.198 0.007 0.005 **
   Retail business 0.075 0.030 0.178 0.338
   Manufacturing/Construction business 0.075 0.027 0.191 0.348
   Home business -0.811 -0.367 0.164 0.000 ***
   Corporation 0.300 0.149 0.149 0.023 **
Area Characteristics
   Density (1000 people/mi
2
) -0.041 -0.126 0.024 0.042 **
   Median household income ($1000) -0.008 -0.111 0.005 0.079 *
Loan Characteristics
   Loan Term (years) 0.036 0.374 0.007 0.000 ***
   Economic injury loan -0.089 -0.023 0.276 0.373
   Applicant Delay 0.001 0.105 0.001 0.064 *
   SBA Approval Delay 0.009 0.137 0.005 0.027 **





Coef.=Beta coefficient;  Coef.*=Beta coefficient standardized on X; 
S.E.=Standard error; p=value represents 1-tailed test






all the coefficients in the model are equal to zero, and the model only explains 
approximately 1 percent of the variation in loan amounts.  
By contrast, Model 2 looks at loan amount as a function of business 
characteristics. Several business characteristics have a significant relationship with loan 
amount. Business that are older and larger are approved for more money, with each year 
the business has been established increasing loan amount by 1.6 percent (p<0.05) and 
each additional employee increasing loan amount by 2.7 percent (p<0.001). Home 
businesses were approved for 97.8 percent less money than businesses with a 
commercial storefront (p-value p<0.001) and corporations were approved for 43.6 
percent more than other organizational forms (p<0.05). Interpreting these results, it may 
be that businesses that are larger, older, and accountable to stakeholders (e.g. 
corporations) are potentially less risky in the eyes of lender, however, without 
controlling for damage these variables could also be capturing higher damage costs 
which would to higher amounts, as well (Webb et al., 2002). Home businesses are likely 
to have other assistance, such as homeowner’s assistance, which would decrease 
business loan amounts since the SBA will not duplicate benefits. In contrast to Model 1, 
the Model 2 is able to explain approximately 33 percent of the variation in loan amount. 
Model 3 looks at loan amounts as a function of area characteristics. Both median 
household income and density at the block group level have a significant, negative 
relationship with loan amount. A $1,000 increase in median household income decreases 
loan amount by 2.4 percent (p<0.001) and each 1000 person increase per square mile 




level of access to resources a business might have at the individual level (median 
household income) and at the community level (density). The model using area 
characteristics can account for six percent of the variation in loan amount. 
Model 4 looks at loan characteristics as a function of other loan characteristics. 
Loan term is highly significant<0.001) and positively related with loan amount. Each 
additional year the business has to pay back the loan increases loan amount by five 
percent. The two time-related variables are also highly significant, with each day after 
Ike it took for the application to be accepted leading to a 0.2 percent increase in loan 
amount, and each day of deliberation between accepting the application and approving 
the loan increasing loan amount by 1 percent. This is also unsurprising, given the value 
of time in state institutions. The type of loan, whether a physical disaster loan or an 
economic injury loan, was insignificant. Model 3 can explain close to 28 percent of the 
variation in loan amount.  
Lastly, Model 5 is the full model. This model can explain 46 percent of the 
variation in loan amount. There was very little change from the smaller models to the 
full model in terms of which variables were significant. Flood depth is positively related 
with loan amount, with each additional foot of water increasing loan amount by 3.8 
percent, however it is only marginally significant (p<0.1). Wind speed is not significant. 
Business age and size were positive, significant predictors of loan amount. Each 
additional year the business has been established increased approved loan amount by 1.6 
percent (p<0.05) and each additional employee increased loan amount by 1.9 percent 




corporations were approved for 30 percent more money (p<0.05). Years under current 
management and sector were insignificant. A $1,000 increase in median household 
income decreased loan amount by 0.8 percent (p<0.001) and each 1000 person increase 
per square mile yields a 4.1 percent decrease in loan amount (p<0.1). Lastly, each 
additional year on the term of the loan increased loan amount 3.6 percent (p<0.001), 
each additional day of applicant delay increased loan amount by 0.1 percent (p<0.1) and 
each additional day of SBA delay and deliberation increased loan amount by 0.9 percent 
(p<0.05). Loan type was again insignificant.  
Looking at the evidence as a whole, one can make some observations on the 
strongest predictors, and get a sense of the motivations and priorities of the loan program 
from the side of the SBA. The theory suggests that there is a balance between whether 
loans should be purely aid-based (loan amounts are driven by damage) or if loan amount 
is based purely on repayment ability, namely the balance of the community and market 
logics. The model using business characteristics alone could explain 33 percent of the 
variation in loan amount whereas the model with only damage variables explained closer 
to 1 percent. This provides evidence to suggest that repayment ability may be better able 
to explain the variation in loan amount. It is possible, however, that without controlling 
for damage in Model 2, business characteristics are still indirectly capturing the 
magnitude of potential damage, since larger and more successful businesses potentially 
have more to lose in a disaster and consequently need more money (Webb et al., 2002). 
Therefore, I also report the X-standardized coefficients in the full model, which 




2002; Scott Long, 1997). Being a home business had the highest relative magnitude of 
effect, followed by loan term, business age, number of employees, and whether the 
business was a corporation. Four of the five variables with the highest magnitude of 
effect were business characteristics; flood depth was the seventh highest. This suggests 
that models using businesses characteristics are still better at predicting loan amount, 
even when controlling for the full set of variables.  As a whole the evidence seems to 
suggests that, although meant as a form of disaster assistance, repayment ability may 
drive much of the decision-making in the loan program from the side of the SBA. 
 
5.1.2. Which Businesses are More Likely to Use SBA Loans in Recovery? 
 The second model examines why a business ultimately chooses to participate in 
the SBA loan program and establish a relationship with the SBA. I hypothesized that 
business characteristics, such as dominant logic, might affect the likelihood that a 
business has a loan disbursed to them. Businesses who have remained small as they age, 
indicating a rejection of market pressures and a propensity to follow a community logic, 
may be more likely to take a loan due to disparate impacts to their resource networks. 
Conversely, corporations—because of their obligation to shareholders—are more likely 
to follow a market logic, less likely to have their resource networks disrupted, and be 
less likely to take a loan.  In addition, the literature suggests that assistance to businesses 
may not be effective due to the debt burden of taking a loan in tandem with the rising 




amount and damage affects the decision of businesses to incur this debt. The model 
controls for area characteristics and other business and loan characteristics.  
 This analysis uses the same variables as the previous model, except now loan 
amount ($1,000, untransformed) is used as a predictor. The model, using logistic 


















































Table 15 Logistic Regression of Whether or not a Business Choses Disbursement. 
 
Flood damage is negatively related to probability of disbursal. For every foot 
increase in flood depth, the odds of choosing disbursement fall by nine percent (p<0.1). 
Wind speed was not significant, perhaps again illustrating the nature of the hazard. 
Variable   Coef.  O.R. S.E.
   Constant 0.185 1.203 0.959 0.424
Damage
   Flood depth (ft.) -0.097 0.907 0.062 0.058 *
   Average maximum wind speed (m/s) 0.001 1.001 0.024 0.492
Business Characteristics
   Age of business (years) 0.032 1.033 0.020 0.059 *
   Length of current management (years) -0.022 0.978 0.025 0.188
   Number of employees 0.098 1.104 0.035 0.003 **
   Retail business 1.178 3.249 0.455 0.005 **
   Manufacturing/Construction business 0.802 2.230 0.486 0.050 **
   Home business 0.111 1.117 0.376 0.384
   Corporation -0.896 0.408 0.364 0.007 **
Area Characteristics
   Density (1000 people/mi
2
) 0.073 1.076 0.059 0.109
   Median household income ($1000) 0.005 1.005 0.013 0.359
Loan Characteristics
   Loan Term (years) -0.020 0.980 0.016 0.104
   Economic injury loan 0.507 1.661 0.845 0.274
   Approved Loan Amount ($1,000) -0.001 0.999 0.001 0.080 **
   Applicant Delay 0.003 1.003 0.002 0.091 **
   SBA Approval Delay 0.030 1.031 0.013 0.010 **
Variable interactions
   Age of business (years)*Number of employees -0.002 0.998 0.001 0.006 **
χ2 31.63 (p-value 0.017)
-2 log (L1) -260
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared 0.108
N 249
Coef.=Logit coefficient; O.R.=Odds ratio; S.E.=Standard error of the logit coefficient; 
p=value represents 1-tailed test






Business characteristics, in general, were significant predictors of whether or not a 
business chose to actually receive the loan. Older businesses and larger businesses were 
more likely to choose disbursal, with the odds of choosing disbursement increasing by 
three percent for each additional year of age (p<0.1) and 10 percent per one employee 
increase in staff (p<0.05). Size and age are often used as a proxy for organizational 
resources, so larger businesses choosing to take the loans might be capturing the idea 
that they are more comfortable in risking the accumulation of more debt, especially after 
a disaster when the future of the business is less certain. In terms of sector, 
retail/wholesale and manufacturing/construction businesses were both more likely than 
other sectors to accept the loan; being a retail/wholesale business resulted in a 224 
percent increase in odds (p<0.05) and manufacturing/construction businesses resulted in 
a 123 percent increase in odds (p<0.05).  
Loan characteristics were also significant in the model. The longer the loan term, 
the less likely a business was to accept the loan; odds of choosing disbursement 
decreasing by about 2 percent for each additional year needed for repayment. Perhaps 
contrary to expectation, the longer it took the business to both apply and be approved for 
a loan, the more likely the business was to take the loan; specifically, each additional day 
of applicant delay increased the odds of disbursal by 0.3 percent and each day of SBA 
delay increased odds of disbursement by 3.1 percent. To speculate, this may indicate that 
a business that waits longer to put in an application may have already made the decision 
to accept the loan if they were approved, since they had longer to assess their current and 




decision after the approval, or while the application is being processed. Or, lastly, it 
could simply indicate that the business was out of financial options by the time the loan 
was accepted. For SBA delay, it may simply compound the last point or indicate that 
more deliberation occurred. Because these variables were significant in this model as 
well as the model for Research Question 1.1, I made the decision to further explore 
which types of businesses were more likely to be delayed in Appendix E.  
All of the theoretical variables from the hypotheses were also significant. Loan 
amount was negatively associated with the probability of disbursement. The odds of 
choosing to have the loan disbursed decreased by 0.1 percent for each additional $1,000 
for which the business was approved. Corporations, the proxy for market businesses, had 
odds of choosing disbursement that were 59 percent lower than other types of 
businesses. The interaction between size and age, the proxy for community businesses, 
was also significant: smaller businesses were more likely to choose disbursal if they 
were older, conversely larger and older businesses were less likely to choose disbursal 






Figure 10 Adjusted Predictions for the Interaction Term in Model 6. 
 
Lastly, I report a variety of model fit statistics, namely the sensitivity and 
specificity of the logistic regression in Table 16 and the receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC) curve in Figure 11. In general, the model correctly classifies 72.29 
percent of the observations and has an area under ROC curve of 0.724. The model is 
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Table 16 Sensitivity and Specificity of the Logistic Regression Predicting 
Disbursement. 
Classified D ~D Total 
+ 171 59 230 
- 10 9 19 
Total 181 68 249 
    
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) ≥ 0.5  
True D defined as disbursement ≠ 0  
   
Sensitivity Pr( + | D ) 94.48% 
Specificity Pr( - | ~D ) 13.24% 
Positive predictive value Pr( D | + ) 74.35% 
Negative predictive value Pr( ~D | - ) 47.37% 
False + rate for true ~D Pr( + | ~D ) 86.76% 
False - rate for true D Pr( - | D ) 5.52% 
False + rate for classified + Pr( ~D | + ) 25.65% 
False - rate for classified - Pr( D | - ) 52.63% 
Correctly classified   72.29% 
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In general, the evidence of the model suggests that businesses under different 
institutional logics have different likelihoods of choosing disbursement. Corporations, 
the proxy for organizations under a market logic, are less likely to take a loan. Referring 
back to Figures 1-3, Corporations are less likely to have all their resource networks 
destroyed in a disaster and may be able to rebuild their networks without relying on 
external assistance. Conversely, businesses under a community logic, for example the 
proxy of older businesses that have remained small (and thereby rejecting market 
pressures), whose networks are more likely to be disrupted, are more likely to take loans 
and establish a relationship with external organizations like the SBA.  
There is also evidence to suggest that businesses chose to take or reject loans 
based on the potential debt burden. Loan amount and damage were significant, negative 
predictors of whether or not a business accepted the loan, which might be expected if 
that were the case. In addition, businesses that are well-equipped to deal with this debt 
also seem to have higher probabilities of taking a loan:  larger businesses, older 
businesses, and manufacturing businesses (who likely see higher demand after a 
disaster) are more likely to take the loan. Retail is the only exception to this statement, 
with retail businesses being more likely to take a loan even though they are a 
traditionally vulnerable sector after a disaster (Alesch et al., 2001; Brunton, 2014; Webb 







5.2. Do Loans Improve Survival Probabilities in the Long Term? 
The next set of analyses uses the matched case-control sample of businesses to 
examine whether or not receiving SBA loans and/or moving had a significant effect on 
business survival nine years after Hurricane Ike. As discussed in Section 4.3.2.2, this 
analysis requires the use of conditional logistic regression. Conditional logistics 
regression, as opposed to simple logistic regression, groups data by strata and calculates 
the likelihood relative to each group (i.e. uses a conditional likelihood) and is 
traditionally used in case-control studies (Pearce, 2016). The equation, reprinted from 










xo,   (Kuo et al., 2018, Eq.2) 
 
Where π represents the probability of survival. Xm ={Xm1, Xm2} is a vector of 
matching variables—variables in Xm1 are exactly matched and variables in Xm2 are 
interval matched—and Xo is a vector of unmatched variables to include in the model 
(Kuo et al., 2018). Xm1 includes sector and whether the business is female-owned, a 
home business, or a branch, Xm2 represents number of employees, sales, and damage 
information, and Xo represents the independent variables of density, median household 
income, and whether the business moved to a new location (excluding downsizing). 
Only Xm2 is included in the conditional model because there will be no variation in Xm1 
within strata, but because I coarsened the continuous variables during matching—flood 




(Kuo et al., 2018). Lastly, Xe is an exposure variable indicating case–control status (in 
this research, whether or not the business received an SBA loan) with S being the id of 
matching sets; s = i for subjects in the ith matching set for i = 1, 2, …, n (Kuo et al., 
2018). The β’s, as conventionally defined, are the regression coefficients. Where βoi 
denotes the contribution to the logit of all terms constant within the ith matching set 
(Kuo et al., 2018).  
The measurement of the independent variables follows that of the previous 
analysis. Density and median household income were taken from the 2000 U.S. 
Decennial Census at the block group level. Whether the business moved and their 
operating status were both collected primarily. Treatment status was designated by the 
SBA dataset and was broken down in further by whether the business was approved and 
didn’t take a loan and whether a business was approved and had the loan disbursed. 
Employment and sales information was taken from the ReferenceUSA database. Wind 
data was created by Oceanweather Inc. and obtained through the SURA coastal and 
ocean modeling test bed study, and flood depth information was developed by the Harris 
County Flood Control District (Harris County Flood Control District; Integrated Ocean 
Observing System; Oceanweather Inc.). The strata for the matching sets was done 
through the CEM matching process (Section 4.3.2.1). Descriptive statistics are provided 







Table 17 Descriptive Statistics for Conditional Logistic Regression.  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
    Survived (yes=1; no=0) 280 0.66 0.47 0.0 1.0 
Treatment Status      
    Loan: Accepted/Not Disbursed (yes=1; no=0) 280 0.13 0.33 0.0 1.0 
    Loan: Accepted/Disbursed (yes=1; no=0) 280 0.38 0.48 0.0 1.0 
    No Loan (yes=1; no=0) 280 0.50 0.50 0.0 1.0 
Damage      
    Flood depth (ft.; midpoint)1 280 4.91 3.32 0.0 11.0 
    Average maximum wind speed (m/s) 280 24.96 6.81 0.0 40.0 
Business Characteristics      
    Number of employees 280 6.54 9.20 1.0 80.0 
    Sales ($1000) 280 1,008.90 1,710.82 55.0 15,616.0 
    Branch (yes=1; no=0) 280 0.04 0.19 0.0 1.0 
    Female owned or managed (yes=1; no=0) 280 0.20 0.40 0.0 1.0 
    Home dummy (yes=1; no=0) 280 0.07 0.25 0.0 1.0 
Relocation      
    Moved (yes=1; no=0) 280 0.16 0.37 0.0 1.0 
Area Characteristics      
    Density (1000 people/mi2) 280 3.58 2.95 0.0 16.4 
    Median household income ($1000) 280 36.70 17.33 7.8 94.0 
1Flood depth will be used as a continuous measure, see Appendix G 
 
There were 140 groups (280 observations) with no missing data. Of the 280 
businesses, 66 percent of them survived. A total of 13 percent of businesses were 
approved but ended up not taking the loan and 38 percent were approved and also took 
the money. Exactly 50 percent of the observations are controls and had no loan. Across 
all businesses the average flood depth was 4.9 feet, the average maximum wind speed 
was 24.96 m/s, the average number of employees was 7, and the average sales volume 
was $1,008,900. Approximately 16 percent of businesses moved to a new location. 
Generally, businesses were located in areas with an average of 3,580 people per square 




The results of the conditional logistic regression are presented in Table 15, 
below. The first model uses both treatment indicators (i.e. loan approval and loan 
disbursal) with their controls and the second model uses only treatment/control pairs of 
businesses that chose disbursement. 
Table 18 Conditional Logistic Regression on Business Survival. 
 
In both models, having the loan disbursed was a significant, positive predictor of 
survival. Receiving a loan more than doubled the odds of survival. Being approved for a 
loan and refusing disbursement was insignificant in predicting survival. In terms of the 
independent variables, businesses that moved were much more likely (p<0.05) to survive 
in both models: in Model 7, odds of survival were 2.8 times higher for businesses who 
Variable O.R. Coef.   S.E. O.R. Coef.   S.E.
Damage
    Flood depth (ft.) 0.920 -0.083 0.200 0.339 0.806 -0.212 0.212 0.156
    Average maximum wind speed (m/s) 1.077 0.075 0.046 0.055 * 1.043 0.041 0.050 0.197
Business Characteristics
    Number of employees 0.934 -0.069 0.090 0.224 0.883 -0.124 0.105 0.119
    Sales volume ($1,000) 1.001 0.001 0.001 0.224 1.001 0.001 0.001 0.069 *
Treatment Status
    Loan approved but not disbursed 0.957 -0.044 0.536 0.468 - - -
    Loan disbursed 0.813 0.325 0.733 0.006 ** 2.447 0.901 0.350 0.006 **
Area Characteristics
    Density (1000 people/mi
2
) 0.901 -0.105 0.073 0.076 * 0.915 -0.088 0.080 0.134
    Median household income ($1,000) 1.012 0.012 0.013 0.172 1.012 0.013 0.015 0.216
Adaptation
    Moved 2.805 1.032 0.529 0.026 ** 3.904 1.339 0.644 0.018 **
χ2 18.88 (p-value 0.026) 18.40 (p-value 0.018)
-2 log (L1) 124 91.26





O.R.=Odds ratio; S.E.=Standard error; p=value represents 1-tailed test
* = p ≤ 0.1;  ** = p ≤ 0.05;  *** = p ≤ 0.001
a
48 groups (98 observations) dropped because of all positive or all negative outcomes
b
33 groups (68 observations) dropped because of all positive or all negative outcomes
p-value p-value




moved than those who didn’t, and the odds were 3.9 times higher for businesses who 
moved in Model 8.  Area characteristics were insignificant predictors in both models 
with the exception of density, which was marginally significant (p<0.1) in Model 7. 
Businesses in higher density areas were less likely to survive. Only a few of the 
continuous matching variables were significant. In Model 7, the differences in sales and 
wind speed within strata were marginally significant (p<0.1); sales and wind speeds 
were positively associated with survival probability. In Model 8, the sales variable is still 
marginally significant and a positive predictor whereas the effect of wind speed 
disappears. The magnitude of these effects is small due to the nature of how they were 
controlled for in the matching.  
It is important to note that conditional logistic regression is meant to examine 
variability within groups, in this case our matching strata. However, if there is no 
variability within groups, the model has nothing to examine and it drops the observations 
within those groups. In the case of Model 7 and 2, 48 groups (98 observations) and 33 
groups (68 observations) were dropped, respectively, due to observations all having the 
same dependent variable within strata. Of the 98 businesses that were excluded from 
Model 7, 84 of them were excluded for being all open. 14 were excluded for being all 
closed. Of the 68 businesses excluded from Model 8, 60 of them were excluded for 
being all open and only eight excluded for being all closed.  To see which businesses 
were more likely to have the same outcome, and therefore be exclude from the analysis, 
I run a logistic regression to predict same outcome (open) and same outcome (closed) 




(Model 10) sets of businesses. These models are presented in Table 19. For simplicity, I 
report the results in terms of odds ratios. 
 
Table 19 Logistic Regression Predicting Same Outcomes. 
 
Both Models 9 and 10 show that there are variables that can significantly predict 
whether the group was excluded for having the same outcome. For Model 9, survival 
status, the number of employees the business had, flood depth, and whether the business 
was a branch significantly predicted whether the groups would be excluded (same 
outcome).  If a business was open, they were 380 percent more likely to be in a group 
that was excluded from the analysis, and this was highly significant (p<0.001). A one-
Variable 
O.R. O.R.* S.E. O.R. O.R.* S.E.
   Constant 0.937 - 0.049 0.088 * 0.653 - 0.883 0.377
Damage
   Flood depth (ft.) 0.931 -21.2 0.049 0.088 * 0.940 -20.1 0.058 0.149
   Average maximum wind speed (m/s) 0.978 -14.2 0.024 0.178 0.956 -27.8 0.026 0.054 *
Business Characteristics
   Number of employees 1.031 32.7 0.019 0.050 ** 1.027 32.3 0.018 0.063 *
   Sales volume ($1,000) 1.000 18.0 0.000 0.168 1.000 4.8 0.000 0.406
   Branch 0.153 -29.5 0.131 0.015 ** 0.192 -27.2 0.179 0.040 **
   Female-owned or managed 1.397 14.3 0.495 0.173 2.331 40.3 1.021 0.023 **
Area Characteristics
   Density (1000 people/mi
2
) 1.062 19.5 0.057 0.133 1.098 33.1 0.072 0.076 *
   Median household income ($1,000) 1.010 18.5 0.009 0.148 1.012 24.2 0.011 0.136
Status
   Moved 1.388 12.8 0.518 0.133 1.376 11.4 0.595 0.258
   Operating Status 4.802 110.1 1.685 0.000 *** 6.454 139.3 2.929 0.000 ***
χ2 51.97 (p-value 0.000) 47.18 (p-value 0.000)
-2 log (L1) 311 219
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared 0.14 0.18
N 280 212
O.R.=Odds ratio; O.R.*=percent change in odds standardized on X; S.E.=Standard error (O.R.);
 p=value represents 1-tailed test
* = p ≤ 0.1;  ** = p ≤ 0.05;  *** = p ≤ 0.001
p-value p-value




employee increase also significantly (p<0.05) increases the odds of being excluded by 
three percent. By contrast, being a branch significantly (p<0.05) decreases the odds of 
being excluded by 80 percent. Lastly, going up in flood depth category decreased the 
odds of being excluded by six percent. This was only marginally significant (p<0.1). 
Model 10, however, had more significant variables, with density, number of employees, 
wind speed, branch status, female-ownership or management, and survival status 
predicting exclusion. Density and number of employees were marginally significant 
(p<0.1) and increased the odds of being excluded by nine percent and three percent per 
unit increase, respectively. Whether the business was open significantly (p<0.000) 
increased the odds of being excluded by a huge 540 percent. Being female-owned or 
managed also significantly (p<0.05) increased the odds of being excluded by 137 percent 
compared to other businesses. A one m/s increase in average wind speed decreased the 
odds of exclusion by four percent (p<0.1) and branch status decreased the odds of 
exclusion by 80 percent compared to other businesses (p<0.05). 
 Lastly, I can look at the sector differences between excluded and included 










Table 20 Sector Differences Between Included Groups and Total Groups. 
 Accepted Disbursed 






11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and 
Hunting 
2 0 -1% 0 0 0% 
21 Mining 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
23 Construction 18 10 -1% 14 8 -1% 
31-33 Manufacturing 12 8 0% 12 8 0% 
42 Wholesale Trade 4 2 0% 2 2 0% 
44 – 45 Retail Trade 68 42 -1% 54 36 0% 
48 – 49 Transportation and 
Warehousing 
8 0 -3% 8 0 -4% 
51 Information 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
52 Finance and Insurance 8 4 -1% 6 4 0% 
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 6 2 -1% 4 2 0% 
54 Professional, Scientific, and 
Technical Services 
32 28 4% 28 24 3% 
55 Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 
0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
56 Administrative and Support and 
Waste Management and Remediation 
Services 
4 2 0% 4 2 0% 
61 Educational Services 2 2 0% 2 2 0% 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 28 16 -1% 20 12 -1% 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and 
Recreation 
10 8 1% 10 8 1% 
72 Accommodation and Food 
Services 
48 36 3% 30 24 3% 
81 Other Services 30 22 1% 18 12 0% 





 In general, the sector differences are not hugely problematic and are similar in 
both the accepted sample and the disbursed only sample. Transportation and 
warehousing businesses were excluded from the analysis completely. Professional, 
scientific, and technical services and accommodation and food services businesses were 




 To conclude, although the analysis excluded quite a bit of observations, I believe 
the analysis is still valid and the research question still adequately addressed; this 
analysis answers, if there is a difference in survival between similar businesses, whether 
we can attribute that difference to a loan. Models 7 and 8 provide evidence that having a 
loan disbursed significantly increased likelihood of survival within groups of similar 
(matched) businesses. Additionally, based on the evidence, most of the observations that 
were excluded were excluded for groups of businesses being open; the standardized 
coefficient was 110 in Model 9 and 139 in Model 10, which were both over three times 
higher than the second-highest standardized coefficient in terms of its magnitude. The 
fact that more businesses are excluded for both being open rather than closed is 
unsurprising when considering the matching technique. I matched businesses with 
controls based on their ability to be approved for a loan; loans are approved based on 
ability to repay and therefore the matching is also selecting businesses that are more 
likely to survive.  From an interpretation side, excluding open businesses is potentially 
less concerning that excluding closed businesses. For businesses and policymakers 
concerned with the businesses in their community, failure is more of an issue than 
survival, and failed businesses were more likely to be included in the analysis.  
Otherwise, businesses in the analysis of approved businesses were smaller, more 
likely to be branches, and with higher average flood depths. Businesses in the analysis of 
only businesses with disbursed loans were more likely were smaller, more likely to be 
branches, less likely to be female-owned or managed, and with higher average wind 




compared to the survival status variable.  In addition, businesses were still included in 
the analysis that represented these variables, the distribution is simply different. The 
analysis is not meant to make conclusions on the distribution of all businesses, but rather 
the differences between similar (based on matching) businesses. One last way to get 
around this issue and not exclude groups would be to run a fixed effects linear 
probability model. This would make the outcomes slightly different in all groups. The 
results of running a fixed effect linear probability model (XTREG FE in STATA 
grouped by the matching strata) are shown in Appendix H. The results of this model still 
show treatment status as a significant, positive predictor of survival. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
To summarize, this research began with several questions: 
 
Research Question 1. Which businesses benefit from the SBA loan program? 
Research Question 1.1. What determines loan amount? 
Research Question 1.2. Which businesses are more likely to use SBA 
loans in recovery? 
Research Question 2. Do SBA loans improve survival probabilities in the long 
term? 
 
I generated hypotheses that were motivated by both the empirical business and 
disaster literature and organizational theory, with the relationship between these 
presented in Figure 5. I then ran several statistical analyses to test these hypotheses and 
answer the research questions. The final section of this research will summarize of the 
findings by research question—specifically addressing the results of each hypothesis test 
that fell under the research question of interests—and a discussion on the implication of 
these findings in terms of planning, policy, organizations theory, and business and 
disaster research. Lastly, I conclude with limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
6.1. Summary of Findings 
Research Question 1 was broken down into two parts. For Research Question 1.1 




approved by the SBA loan program. In Section 2.3.1, I theorized that the SBA loan 
program falls under the logic of the state, defined by the y-axis characteristics identified 
in Table 2. After a disaster, the state balances the needs of the community with the 
overall needs of its constituents—its stakeholders extend beyond the affected area. 
Additionally, I argue that the community relinquishes its bargaining position after 
disasters and the SBA can, therefore, lean closer to the market to assuage taxpayer 
concerns of fiscal responsibility (the majority) rather than be purely philanthropic for the 
taxpayers in the damaged community (the minority). Therefore, it seems likely that the 
SBA loan program would prioritize repayment ability over need. I hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The larger the business, the more likely it will be approved for 
higher loan amounts. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The older the business, the more likely it will be approved for 
higher loan amounts. 
 
I also hypothesized that, due to the weak negotiating position of businesses after 
a disaster, the state logic becomes dominant and therefore longer times are preferable as 
they are more legitimate: 
 





The results of the OLS regression on loan amount supported Hypotheses 1-3 with 
number of employees, age, and SBA deliberation time being significant, positive 
predictors of loan amount.  Other significant variables in the model included flood depth, 
whether the business was home-based, whether the business was a corporation, density 
at the 2000 census block group level, median household income at the 2000 census block 
group level, loan term, and applicant delay. Flood depth, corporate status, loan term, and 
applicant delay were positively associated with loan amount and home-based, higher 
density, and higher income were negatively associated with loan amount.  
For Research Question 1.2 I ran a logistic regression on which businesses were 
more likely to establish a relationship with the SBA and take the loan for which they 
were approved. I suggested that organizations under the community logic, due to their 
geographic distance, are more likely to become dependent on external partners under the 
state and market logics. This also means that businesses who are less centered in the 
community logic and more market-driven will be less dependent. It is likely corporations 
are less centered in community logics since they are more likely to have other locations 
and external pressures from stockholders, and corporations are significantly less likely to 
take disbursement. Additionally, older businesses that have remained small indicate that 
they may be less profit-driven and more of a community business as defined in the 
planning sphere (Jacobs, 1961). Therefore, I specifically hypothesized: 
 






Hypothesis 5. Corporations are less likely to accept SBA loans. 
 
These hypotheses were also supported by the logistic regression. The interaction 
term between size and age was also significant: smaller businesses were more likely to 
choose disbursal if they were older, conversely larger and older businesses were less 
likely to choose disbursal. Corporations were less likely to choose disbursal compared to 
other organizational forms. Based on these proxies for the community and market logics, 
there is evidence to suggest that businesses under different institutional logics have 
different likelihoods of choosing disbursement and becoming dependent on state 
resources.  
The debt burden hypothesis (James Dahlhamer, 1998) was also tested with the 
logistic regression. It stands to reason that businesses would be wary of higher loan 
amounts because they mean incurring more debt in an unreliable environment. I 
hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Businesses with higher damage are less likely to choose 
disbursement. 
 






 Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 7 were supported by the model. Loan amount and 
damage were significant, negative predictors of whether or not a business accepted the 
loan, which might be expected if businesses chose to take or reject loans based on the 
potential debt burden. Other significant variables in the model included business age, 
business size, business sector, applicant delay, and SBA delay. All of these variables had 
a positive relationship with probability of choosing disbursement.  
Research Question 2 and Research Question 3 look at the types of actions 
businesses can after a disaster event that may affect their survival probabilities in the 
long run. The literature suggests that capital is extremely important for business recovery 
since businesses must be profitable to survive. There has been some doubt, however, of 
the ability of recovery programs to be effective replacements for this capital. I used a 
matching methodology to isolate the loan effect from potentially confounding variables 
and found that loans significantly improved survival probabilities. I hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 8. Businesses that receive SBA loans are more likely to survive. 
 
In addition, being able to move in the face of a changing environment post-
disaster may be the difference in a business’s survival since businesses are sensitive to 
changes in their customer base. I included whether a business moved as another variable 
of interest in the matched analysis, essentially controlling for resource access to see 
whether moving affected survival. Specifically, I ran a conditional logistic regression 




if loan status and mobility affected survival. I found that both choosing to receive a loan 
and moving were positive predictors of survival nine years after Hurricane Ike. Having 
higher sales was also a positive predictor of survival, however this was a matched 
variable and should be thought of as a control variable. This variable was likely 
significant (rather than damage and number of employees) since the range of acceptable 




 The goal of this research was to take a holistic approach to the study of loan 
effectiveness, taking the perspective of both the loan provider and the receivers of the 
assistance to understand not only the outcome of interest, but also why that outcome 
occurs, and how the program may be realistically improved. This research found that 
SBA loans did improve survival probabilities in the long term, but certain businesses 
were more likely to receive higher loan amounts and were more likely to use the loans in 
their recovery. 
 This research contributes to existing knowledge by not only trying to better 
understand the effect of SBA loan on business recovery, but also understanding who the 
program serves and benefits. There is some evidence to support the notion that 
businesses that benefit from the SBA loan program were more resilient to begin with. 
Although denial information was unavailable, motivations of the SBA program could 




corporations were approved for higher loan amounts and the model looking at loan 
amount as a function of business characteristics was able to explain close to 33 percent 
of its variation. Although flood damage also had a positive relationship with loan 
amount, the model looking at loan amount as a function of damage alone was only able 
to explain 1 percent of the variation in loan amount. When looking at the X-standardized 
coefficients in the full model, four of the five variables with the highest magnitude of 
effect were business characteristics; flood depth was the seventh highest. This suggests 
that businesses characteristics are still better predictors of loan amount, even when 
controlling for the full set of variables.  This provides some support to the broader 
speculation that the SBA prioritizes repayment ability over need and the state logic 
dictates the relationship between the business and the SBA. Lastly, there were 1,158 
businesses that were denied a loan, a majority of which were denied due to repayment 
ability (see Table 21). Although 555 businesses were approved for loan, a large portion 
of those businesses could be considered more real estate property as opposed to a for-
profit business. Only 262 businesses were deemed eligible for this study making the 
SBA loan program quite exclusive.  
 Businesses also differed in whether or not they even chose to use loans in their 
recovery even if they were approved. Of those 262 businesses, only 187 (71 percent) 
actually had the money disbursed to them. In general, the model suggests that businesses 
may be aware of the debt burden of a loan during recovery. Businesses are less likely to 
take a loan if they are damaged and approved for higher amounts. Businesses are more 




being larger or older. However, there is also evidence that businesses also take the loans 
because they have fewer alternative options (i.e. differences in resource dependencies). 
Corporations, the proxy for the market logic, were less likely to choose disbursement 
and smaller, older businesses, the proxy for the community logic, were more likely to 
choose disbursement.  
 These findings make sense given the logics framework used in this research, and 
the research has solidified many of the attributes presented in Table 2. The interests of 
the SBA extend beyond the disaster area and those affected by it. Its geography of 
stakeholders is national and as an organization it must be concerned with repayment 
ability as it relates to accountability. Therefore, the state must balance this need for 
accountability with its mission of providing assistance, which is even more difficult 
when the recipients are for-profit organizations. This results in loans that resemble 
market loans more so than philanthropic donations, which might be more acceptable for 
individuals or households within a capitalist framework. However, this also means that 
businesses may be in debt for up to thirty years (the maximum loan term allowable in the 
SBA disaster loan program), exacerbated by changing community demographics that can 
affect the business’s market and potential revenue (Alesch et al., 2001). Loan 
characteristics were significant predictors of whether or not a business chose to take the 
loan once they were approved. Most notably, businesses were less likely to accept the 
loan as the loan amount increased, indicating that businesses are aware of, and act 




 Additionally, this research provides empirical support that the state logic views 
time as legitimacy. Deliberation time—how long it took from when the SBA received 
the loan application to when it was approved—was positively associated with loan 
amount. Longer deliberation times allow the state to determine the likelihood the 
business will be able to repay the loan as well as reduce the likelihood that the SBA is 
not duplicating benefits, thereby achieving its obligation to the taxpayers. For the 
individual businesses, however, time is a resource. Each day a business waits for the 
funding necessary to re-open or recover, it risks losing its market share to its competitors 
as well as loses the profits it would have amounted if it were open for businesses. This 
may be particularly relevant for businesses in the construction or manufacturing sector. 
Alesch et al. (2001, p. 68), for example, writes about a carpet business after the 
Northridge earthquake:  
 
“The merchant applied for an SBA loan and was turned down. While it looked to 
us as though the business had been prosperous, tax records apparently showed 
that it was not sufficiently prosperous for the SBA to find the merchant loan-
worthy. So there he was. The rebuilding of Northridge had begun. Large carpet 
wholesalers from across the country were swarming over building contractors 
like ants at a picnic, offering spectacular deals for large lot orders. Our merchant 
had no inventory to sell, wasn’t positioned to compete with large wholesalers, 
and had just recently found a place into which he could move. The giant 




 The carpet business references here was unable to capitalize on the increased 
demand for new carpet after the disaster and instead lost its market to outside 
competitors. This may have long-term consequences, as customers replacing their 
carpets all at once are unlikely to do so again for several years, which could mean that 
this business may see a lower-than-average demand moving forward in its recovery on 
top of its capital expenses. This may be a reason why manufacturing/construction 
businesses were more likely to accept disbursement in Model 6. Although they are 
considered a more resilient sector due to this increased disaster-related demand (Webb et 
al., 2000), they are also vulnerable to timing. They may wish to re-open as soon as 
possible, even despite the potential debt burden of the loans. Although this example is of 
a business denied for a loan, this could also be relevant to a business who experienced 
longer delays compared to those within its industry. 
Given this discussion, this research then leads to broader questions of whether 
the state can effectively provide assistance to businesses or even if it should. Though this 
research does not attempt to definitively answer these questions, it will discuss them 




Historical dissatisfaction with federal funding makes sense through the lens of 
differing institutional logics as the expectations for the program will differ depending on 




that, given these logics, the state is ill suited to providing this kind of assistance and its 
role may need to be re-imagined. The state, because its view of time as legitimacy, may 
not be able to act quickly enough for businesses like the carpet business. Although 
businesses were more likely to take the loan if they were more delayed as shown in 
Model 6, model on delay time indicated that businesses that took longer to apply (of 
those that were approved) tended to be stronger businesses (see Appendix E). Those 
businesses who closed during the application process or were denied a loan outright 
were not captured by this analysis.  
Additionally, this research has shown that the SBA loan program benefits those 
businesses who were more likely to be able to pay off the loan. The research also shows 
that even considering potential access to resources through matching, SBA loans were 
positively associated with odds of survival (see Model 8). Because businesses that were 
more damaged were less likely to take loans, an argument could be made the SBA loan 
program is no longer meeting its goal of welfare capitalism and is instead interfering 
with the market. By approving loans, the SBA is rewarding capital access in recovery 
and in a sense making a judgement on what constitutes business resilience. However, if 
only capital-based resilience is supported, then assistance could potentially increase 
inequities. Model 8 did not indicate that the median household income of the census 
block in which the business was located affected recovery, the model again only 
included those businesses approved for loans and their very similar control. Of the loan 
denial codes in Galveston County (see Appendix A), 94% were related to credit or 




already dealing with disproportionate impacts and unequal housing and household 
recoveries (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Peacock, Morrow, & Gladwin, 1997; Van 
Zandt et al., 2012) and exacerbate issues relating to resources and power dynamics 
during recovery (Olshansky et al., 2012). These issues, now coupled with potential 
impacts to employment and opportunity access, could lead to a vicious cycle in these 
neighborhoods. Xiao and Nilawar (2013) illustrate how donut holes of low income and 
employment growth emerge in damaged areas. This research points towards loan denials 
for capital-deficient businesses, lower loan acceptance rates for higher damaged 
businesses, and higher survival odds for businesses that moved. Whether or not these 
phenomena are spatially related has consequences for recovery and will need to be 
examined in future research.  
 This then leads to the question of whether there are better ways for the federal 
government to assist businesses after a disaster. After Hurricane Ike, local banks in 
Galveston offered a bridge loan program that provided businesses with capital while the 
businesses waited for insurance or SBA loans to pay out. If formalized, this could be a 
form of iteration, which Olshansky et al. (2012) recommend to get around post-disaster 
timing issues. Iteration involves prioritization of decisions would be prioritized, meaning 
some decisions would be made immediately with little forethought, and some decisions, 
those requiring more deliberation, are made later (Olshansky et al., 2012). The SBA 
could back private loans for businesses with existing banking relationships and adequate 
credit history as determined by the original lender, meaning the money could be 




could apply to the SBA as usual. Another option would be for SBA, itself, to approve 
much smaller amounts of money more quickly—similar to the concept of bridge loans—
with more relaxed requirements. The smaller loan amounts are potentially less subject to 
scrutiny from the taxpayers and have the potential to help more businesses stay afloat in 
the immediate aftermath since for them time is a resource. Later, businesses desiring 
more money can re-apply and the SBA would already have a relationship and repayment 
history with the business. 
 Rather than suggesting incremental changes to the existing program, a more 
radical option may be changing the form of federal assistance to businesses to resemble 
the earthquake support subsidy that was used after the Christchurch Earthquakes in New 
Zealand. Assisting business through a workforce retention program has the potential to 
address many of the limitations associated with the current strategy. This kind of 
program is essentially place-based in that it encourages businesses to continue 
employing its current people, and employees are encouraged to remain in the community 
with a source of income to begin making their own repairs. There could be a 
coordination with household assistance to combine resources towards this program; 
households and businesses are closely linked and affect each other’s recovery decisions, 
so it would make sense to structure assistance around that relationship (Xiao & Van 
Zandt, 2012). Really, any form of assistance that makes use of the close relationship 
between businesses and households may be an appealing alternative for the state. 
Assistance could take the form of childcare vouchers and programs for employees who 




programs allow the state to provide individual assistance that still helps businesses, 
which may be faced with less scrutiny. 
 
6.2.2. Planning 
Although it is important to ask whether the SBA can affectively assist businesses, 
there can be a discussion of which businesses should be assisted. One position is that 
assistance should go towards those with the highest likelihood of success; for instance, 
those unable to pay back a loan are unlikely to survive, and it is better to replace 
unsuccessful businesses (Schumpeter, 1942b). Based on the findings of this research and 
the previous discussion, SBA loans tend to fall into the latter category. Again, this 
behavior makes sense given the discussion on institutional logics and the way state 
institutions view their role in recovery. An alternative viewpoint is that we should 
support the recovery of all businesses, regardless of their capital resilience, because of 
their social impact on recovery (Xiao & Van Zandt, 2012) and role as community 
members as opposed to simply commercial entities (Xiao, Wu, Finn, & Chandrasekhar, 
2018). Planners may be more likely to fall into the former category.  
Therefore, although this research focuses on the role of federal assistance on 
business recovery, the findings have revealed a space for planners. Because the models 
provide evidence that the SBA highly values repayment ability, the SBA assisted a 
relatively small number of affected businesses. Assuming the number of businesses that 
applied for a loan was to some extent correlated to the need, the SBA still only assisted 




planners in a recovering city can address with local programs. This assistance does not 
need to be monetary. For example, programs that help businesses create an online 
presence and is promoted by the city can help businesses buffer some of the temporary 
demand shifts after disaster by diversifying their market area.  
Recovery planning is still incredibly important, and this research stresses the 
need for including local businesses in this process. At a minimum, understanding 
recovery priorities, changes in regulations, etc. can help businesses in their decision-
making. In addition, knowing the role of the SBA, their logic, and how the program is 
designed to function, is incredibly important in managing business expectations and 
minimizing future frustration (Furlong & Scheberle, 1998). If businesses know that 
approval rates are only around 22 percent, they may be more likely to invest in insurance 
or take mitigation measures. Planners can create toolkits and educational programs to 
promote these types of strategies. These can be as simple as making sure the business 
has contact information for customers and employees on the cloud, or as hands-on as 
helping businesses elevate and secure contents.  
Secondly, Model 8 suggests that moving is positively associated with business 
survival. This could potentially raise issues from the planning and economic 
development perspective. Namely, these findings contribute to the debate of people-
based vs. place-based economic strategies. Encouraging businesses may be beneficial at 
the individual level and moving can potentially help businesses become more resilient to 
future disaster events if they are encouraged to move to higher elevations or more inland. 




influence the return of households (Xiao & Van Zandt, 2012). Encouraging businesses to 
move out of the city by providing more flexible forms of assistance would potentially be 
a significant loss for a damaged community.  
 To reconcile this, having a recovery plan that prioritizes restoration and 
economic development in local commercial areas with less physical disaster risk may 
prevent some outmigration and spatial disparities identified in previous research (Xiao & 
Nilawar, 2013). Predicting business mobility after disasters and getting ahead of it by 
incentivizing moving within the same community may help in business retention. In 
addition, principles of planning that create desirable places, strengthen social networks, 
engage businesses in the process are going to build and strengthen the community logic 
in the business community. This may, in turn, encourage businesses to stay in the 
community.  Xiao et al. (2018) found that businesses do indeed make recovery decisions 
based on community ties and attachments and may remain for reasons outside of the 
management and operation of the business.  Strengthening the community logic may 
also encourage the community to support its businesses. Engaging the private sector in 
recovery, particularly community banks, led to the aforementioned bridge loan program 
that was able to supplement federal funding for businesses in Galveston after Ike 
(Simon, 2016). 
 
6.3. Future research 
 This research opens up several domains for future research. Broadly, these might 




survival, the effect of loan characteristics on business mobility (i.e. whether loan 
encourage or discourage moving), and including organizational ecology as a theoretical 
control. To illustrate, I include these future research topics in the process model and 
conceptual model from Figures 4 and 5 in Section 3. These topics are presented in 
context of this research in Figures 12 and 13, below. 
 
 







Figure 13 Modified Conceptual Model for Future Research. 
 
The results of this research illustrate that moving is another course of action that 
a business may take in the face of a disaster and altered resource dependence, and 
accepting assistance may affect their likelihood of doing so. In addition, moving, 
controlling for resource dependence, may be influenced by institutional logics. For 
example, the market is made up of different kinds of resources. Some resources are 
exchangeable in that they are the same in Houston as they are in Galveston, for 
example—they move across place. Some resources are more worth more in different 
areas and are tied to place. However, institutional logics can also serve as a lens through 
which these resources are viewed. The same resource through the lens of the community 




opportunity to capitalize elsewhere. The exchangeability of resources, therefore, affects 
that desirability of that resource to different logics. However, I also argued that 
businesses operating under different institutional logics have different resource 
dependencies after a disaster, and organizations under the community logic become 
more dependent on state organizations. State resources, however, are constrained by the 
nature of the state logic. For businesses, then, desirability must be weighed by the extent 
of their dependence. Logics will also motivate different actions on the same resource. 
Some businesses might take the money they receive and moved away, whereas some 
rebuild in the same community. Both types of businesses recognize a need to relocate, 
but varied in their degree of embeddedness within the community logic.  
Logics and their consequences for a business’s decisions about moving may also 
have an impact on their survival. One element of organizational ecology is the mortality 
(or selection) of firms within a population or community (Hannan & Freeman, 1993). 
Figure 10 illustrates how organizational ecology is a background process to the already 
observed phenomena. The organizational ecology perspective lends itself very well to 
the resilience and disaster management domain. Future research would move the scope 
of organizational ecology research from slow-onset phenomena and disturbances on 
longer timescales to acute hazards and extreme events. Specifically, it might examine to 
what types of firms are selected after a disaster in a context of altered resource 
dependence and how selection after disasters differs from non-disaster selection 
processes. Using Olshansky et al. (2012)’s theory of disaster time compression, we 




evidence that disasters hasten firm demise in that businesses doing poorly prior to the 
event were much more likely to fail (Alesch et al., 2001).  This, in turn, has implications 
for organizational diversity and resilience of impacted communities to future hazard 
events. In addition, there may be a spatial component to selection. Based on the spatial 
disparities identified by Xiao and Nilawar (2013), it is possible that businesses moving 
outside the impacted community are more likely to survive. Given that moving within or 
outside the original community is motivated by logics, this might indicate that logics 
have tangible effects on recovery outcomes and can act as their own form of 
organizational selection.  
 
6.4. Limitations 
Lastly, I discuss the limitations of this research. Perhaps the most significant is 
the lack of insurance information. Although this information was requested from FEMA, 
it was not furnished in time for the study. This will have to be included in future 
research. This likely affects whether or not a business applies for SBA loans, and would 
need to be controlled for both in the matching process and the models. Additionally, it 
would be better to include more controls in the matching so that issues of no within-
group variance do not occur in the conditional logistic regression. However, the fixed 
effects linear probability model suggests that this did not affect the findings in a 
significant way. Lastly, this research relied on proxies for the community and market 




proxies do not accurately represent these logics (or only partially represent them) and 
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SBA DATA: WITHDRAWAL AND DENIAL INFORMATION 
 
Tables 21 and 22 show the count of denial and withdrawal codes for businesses 
applying for SBA loans in Galveston County after Hurricane Ike. Numbers in each 
category represent denial or withdrawal codes (a business can have more than one code) 





























20 Repayment - Failed Minimum Income Test - - - 
21 Lack of Repayment Ability 428 45 12 
25 Inadequate Working Capital After Loan - 1 - 
26 
Unsatisfactory History on Existing or Previous 
SBA Loan 
21 3 1 
27 Federal Obligation 49 10 1 
28 Unsatisfactory Credit (Based on Credit Bureau) 569 52 1 
29 Unsatisfactory Credit (Other Than Credit Bureau) 5 - 1 
30 No Disaster Damage (Physical) 8 - - 
31A No Economic Injury (No Needs) 6 14 - 
31B 
No Economic Injury (Disaster Gross Margin 
Exceeds Normal) 
2 - - 
31C No Economic Injury (Custom Text) - 1 - 
32 Business Activity Not Eligible (EIDL) 4 2 1 
33 Applicant Business Not Small (EIDL) 1 - - 
34 Credit Available Elsewhere (EIDL) 2 5 - 
36 Ineligible Real Property (Secondary Home, Etc.) 5 - - 
37 Ineligible Personal Property 1 - - 
38 Not Eligible Due to Recoveries 4 - 2 
39A Flood Ins. Not Maintained (SBA Loan) 2 - - 
39B Flood Ins. Not Maintained (Fed Regulated Lender) 10 - - 
39C 
Flood Ins. Not Maintained (As Directed by 
FEMA) 
- - - 
40A Not A Qualified Business (Not Rental) 24 4 1 
40B Not A Qualified Business (Rental) 49 2 - 
41 Refusal to Pledge Available Collateral 1 - - 
42 Delinquent Child Support 6 1 - 
43 Not Eligible (Character Reasons) 1 - - 
44I 
Failed Min Income Test Based on Applicant's 
Income Alone 
- - - 
44R Repayment Based on Applicant's Income Alone 1 - - 
45 No Decision Code 1 1 - 
46A Agricultural Enterprise (Not Eligible) 20 - 1 
46C Property in CBRA (Not Eligible) 1 - - 
46D Not Eligible (Custom Text) 37 7 3 
60D Character Eligibility Determination - Decline 20 3 - 
 Count of Decision Codes  1,278 151 24 















51 Withdraw - Requested Info Not Furnished 134 12 12 
52 Withdraw - Applicant's Request 46 3 1 
53 No Decision Code 19 7 1 
54 
Withdraw - Applicant's Request - Insurance or Other 
Recovery 
22 1 0 
55 No Decision Code 42 3 4 
56A Withdraw - Unable to Verify Property 20 0 0 
56B Withdraw - Custom Text 16 1 2 
57 Withdraw - Consolidation of Multiple Applications 8 0 0 
58 Withdraw - Consolidation of Related Applications 8 0 0 
59 Withdraw - IRS Has No Record 69 6 3 
60A 
Character Elig. Determination - Otherwise 
Approvable Application 
11 2 0 
60W Character Eligibility Determination - Withdrawal 9 1 0 
61 Withdraw - Applicants Request Due to Market Rate 2 0 0 
 Count of Decision Codes  406 36 23 
Distinct Count of Applications 390 36 22 
 
1,177 businesses (including non-profits) were denied an SBA loan. The two most 
common reasons for denial were unsatisfactory credit (622 denial codes) and lack of 
repayment ability (485 denial codes).  448 businesses had their applications withdrawn. 
The most common reason for withdrawal was that the requested information was not 










COMPARING FLOOD DEPTH MEASURES 
 
This section examines the differences between the polygon flood depth data 
provided by the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) and the flood depth 
information generated by the Advanced Circulation (ADCIRC) and Simulating Waves 
Nearshore (SWAN) hydrodynamic models used to simulate Hurricane Ike. Table 22 
looks at the distribution of flood depths from the ADCIRC/SWAN model compared to 
the HCFCD flood depth categories: 
 
Table 23 Comparison of Flood Depth Measures. 
Range Obs. Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
0 76 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.54 
< 2 14 0.89 0.00 0.89 1.31 2.21 
2 - 4 41 3.42 1.83 2.89 5.08 11.25 
4 - 6 71 4.37 3.40 4.75 5.40 10.92 
6 - 8 98 6.83 5.76 6.61 7.63 17.44 
8 - 10 71 7.88 7.37 8.04 8.23 13.42 
> 10 14 9.82 8.38 10.58 12.39 13.72 
 385      
Corr = .85 (p-value=0.0000) 
 
 The mean flood depth of the ADCIRC/SWAN model trends upwards with the 
HCFCD flood depth categories. The ADCIRC/SWAN model mean falls within the 
bounds for all HCFCD categories except for the higher flood depths (8 – 10 feet and > 
10 feet) where the average is slightly lower than the bounds. The median, however, does 
fit within the bounds. The flood depth measures have a correlation of 0.85 (p-value 






Figure 14 Scatterplot of Flood Depth Measures. 
 
 Looking at the measures graphically, it appears that a few low outliers from the 
ADCIRC/SWAN model are causing the mean for the “8 – 10 feet” and “> 10 feet” to be 
below the bounds (while keeping the median fairly accurate). This is likely only an issue 
for fewer than five observations in the dataset. When running the analyses in this 
dissertation, I ran both flood depth measures independently in each of the models and no 
significant differences in variable importance arose. The only difference would be in the 
interpretation of the coefficient values, where the ADCIRC/SWAN model values have 
an advantage given that they are truly continuous measures rather than 





MATCHING SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Choosing the coarsening of variables on which control variables are matched 
with treatment variables can be a subjective process. For this research, deciding on the 
levels of coarsening was done either on a theoretical basis (e.g. wind speed), due to error 
in the data source (e.g. employment), or by existing data groupings (e.g. flood depth and 
sales), and decisions on variable inclusion in the matching process was made based on 
the literature. However, it could be argued that decisions on which matching variables 
and how to coarsen them can introduce bias. This section presents an analysis of the 
sensitivity of the matching process to changes in variable coarsening.   
 The first table, Table 23 looks at how imbalance is reduced at different levels of 
variable coarsening as well as the number of matches able to be generated. Different 
matching attempts are broadly organized by 2-digit vs. 3-digit sector coarsening, then by 
whether branch status, female-owned/managed status, and home business status were 
included in the matching code. Lastly, employment, sales, flood depth, and wind speed 
were coarsened. Because CEM matching randomly chooses a match within the strata, 
two rounds of matching were run for each code. The one that reduced imbalance the 







Table 24 Imbalance Reduction and Number of Matches for 20 CEM Codes. 
Sample 
ID 





Match 1 Match 2 Dif. 
1 2-digit NAICS 149 0.810 0.564 0.490 0.320 
2 
 
coarsened employment to (0 
10 50 100 2000) 
151 0.810 0.682 0.616 0.194 
3 
 
coarsened sales to (0 500000 
1000000 5000000 10000000 
20000000 1000000000) 
151 0.810 0.556 0.576 0.234 
4 
 
coarsened flood depth (0 3 
16) 
151 0.810 0.589 0.623 0.220 
5 
 
coarsened windspeed to 
over/under 96mph (cat 2 
hurricane) 
151 0.810 0.642 0.623 0.187 
6 
 
& branch, female, home 
(same) 
144 0.881 0.674 0.653 0.228 
7  &…coarsened employment 148 0.881 0.669 0.716 0.212 
8  &…coarsened sales 146 0.881 0.685 0.589 0.292 
9  &…coarsened windspeed 148 0.881 0.669 0.635 0.246 
10  & coarsened flood depth 147 0.881 0.735 0.748 0.146 
11 3-digit NAICS 120 0.822 0.608 0.592 0.231 
12 
 
coarsened employment to (0 
10 50 100 2000) 
127 0.822 0.677 0.614 0.208 
13 
 
coarsened sales to (0 500000 
1000000 5000000 10000000 
20000000 1000000000) 
126 0.822 0.595 0.571 0.251 
14 
 
coarsened flood depth (0 6 
16) 
125 0.822 0.608 0.624 0.214 
15 
 
coarsened windspeed to 
over/under 96mph (cat 2 
hurricane) 
127 0.822 0.559 0.598 0.263 
16 
 
& branch, female, home 
(same) 
109 0.887 0.615 0.624 0.272 
17  &…coarsened sales 116 0.887 0.638 0.664 0.249 
18  &…coarsened windspeed 117 0.887 0.624 0.718 0.263 
19  &… coarsened flood depth 117 0.887 0.718 0.632 0.255 
20  &… coarsened employment 114 0.887 0.658 0.640 0.247 
 
The number of matches in the 20 coarsening levels ranged from 109 to 151. 
Matches were lowest when using sector and the three dummy variables. Matches were 




Imbalance was reduced between 0.15 and 0.32. Next, I examine how each of samples 
resulting from the matching codes are distributed across sectors. The percent businesses 
in each sector for each sample ID was subtracted from the percent businesses in each 
sector of the original n=267 sample. Then, the difference was averaged across sector to 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to the average percent off for all sectors, I also included the maximum 
value that any sector was off. I wanted to make sure that there weren’t huge sector 
differences being lost in the averaging process. I then plotted the relationship between 
the maximum value a sector was off to the average difference across sectors. This is 
presented in Figure 
 
 
Figure 15 Relationship Between Average Percent Off and Maximum Value. 
 
As illustrated, those samples with the highest average differences also had the 
highest maximum values so the average seems fine for an indicator. Finally, I took these 
measures and used them to create an overall distance from the original sample that could 
be minimized in Table 25. I used ratio of un-matched to the original sample, imbalance, 
sector average percent difference, and differences in mean for employment, flood depth, 





































1 0.442 0.605 1.558 0.333 0.385 0.128 3.451 1 
2 0.434 0.760 1.477 0.316 0.467 0.220 3.675 2 
3 0.434 0.711 1.465 0.183 0.450 0.875 4.120 5 
4 0.434 0.769 1.477 0.180 0.609 1.483 4.953 10 
5 0.434 0.769 1.465 0.117 0.301 1.100 4.187 7 
6 0.461 0.741 1.570 0.485 0.470 0.213 3.941 4 
7 0.446 0.813 1.566 0.358 0.394 0.337 3.914 3 
8 0.453 0.669 1.530 0.188 0.557 0.733 4.129 6 
9 0.446 0.721 1.455 0.361 0.347 1.623 4.953 11 
10 0.449 0.849 1.547 0.338 0.652 1.274 5.109 14 
11 0.551 0.719 1.848 0.811 0.539 0.331 4.799 9 
12 0.524 0.747 1.842 1.194 0.559 0.095 4.961 12 
13 0.528 0.695 1.790 0.618 0.432 0.501 4.565 8 
14 0.532 0.759 1.757 0.809 1.095 1.340 6.292 18 
15 0.524 0.728 1.601 0.615 0.484 1.908 5.859 17 
16 0.592 0.703 1.793 0.817 0.603 0.662 5.170 15 
17 0.566 0.748 1.900 0.580 0.586 0.694 5.074 13 
18 0.562 0.809 1.817 0.441 0.577 3.157 7.363 20 
19 0.562 0.713 2.149 0.663 1.064 1.673 6.825 19 
20 0.573 0.722 2.061 0.994 0.640 0.695 5.684 16 
 
According to this methodology, ID 1 is the best sample. Coarsening employment 
also helped, which made ID 2 and ID 7 ranked next. The code that was actually used in 
this research was ID 6, which was still ranked 4th. However, from a theoretical 
standpoint, ID 6 is still beneficial because it includes branch, female 
ownership/management, and a home-based indicator. There is also an argument to be 
made that coarsening employment to 1, 10, and 50 loses a lot of variation in businesses 






A COMPARISON OF BUSINESSES THAT WERE APPROVED FOR SBA LOANS 
TO GALVESTON BUSINESS POPULATION AND HURRICANE IKE-FLOODED 
BUSINESSES 
I compare the sample of businesses that were approved for an SBA loan—with 
vacation homes and non-profits removed—to the overall business population in 
Galveston County. Specifically, sector distribution is compared to 2007 firm counts from 
both the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (only 
employing firms) as well as Nonemployer Statistics (NES) from the U.S. Census (non-
















Table 27 Firms Receiving SBA Loans by Sector Compared to 2007 Total Firms 













11 Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing and Hunting 
9 3.44 14 475 489 2.06 1.38 
21 Mining 2 0.76 44 155 199 0.84 -0.07 
23 Construction 28 10.69 470 2147 2617 11.01 -0.33 
31-33 Manufacturing 10 3.82 189 304 493 2.07 1.74 
42 Wholesale Trade 5 1.91 263 323 586 2.47 -0.56 
44 – 45 Retail Trade 48 18.32 797 1712 2509 10.56 7.76 
48 – 49 Transportation 
and Warehousing 
7 2.67 173 835 1008 4.24 -1.57 
51 Information 1 0.38 67 194 261 1.10 -0.72 
52 Finance and Insurance 7 2.67 289 505 794 3.34 -0.67 
53 Real Estate Rental and 
Leasing 
17 6.49 291 1751 2042 8.59 -2.10 
54 Professional, 
Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
30 11.45 522 2531 3053 12.85 -1.40 
55 Management of 
Companies and 
Enterprises 
1 0.38 20 N/A 20 0.08 0.30 
56 Administrative and 
Support and Waste 
Management and 
Remediation Services 
7 2.67 262 1969 2231 9.39 -6.72 
61 Educational Services 1 0.38 134 496 630 2.65 -2.27 
62 Health Care and Social 
Assistance 
19 7.25 486 1304 1790 7.53 -0.28 
71 Arts, Entertainment, 
and Recreation 
11 4.20 113 816 929 3.91 0.29 
72 Accommodation and 
Food Services 
32 12.21 559 317 876 3.69 8.53 
81 Other Services 27 10.31 523 2527 3050 12.84 -2.53 
Total 262  5216  18361   
 
Retail businesses and accommodation and food service businesses were more 
likely to have been approved for an SBA loan than other sectors. Conversely, businesses 




likely to have been approved for an SBA loan. However, since I do not have individual-
level data on businesses that applied, the reason could be either that businesses in those 
sectors were more likely to apply or that businesses in those sectors were more likely to 
be approved. I also note that real estate businesses approved for an SBA loan, when 
removing vacation homes, are proportional to the overall population of businesses in the 
county; 254 businesses, almost half of all businesses approved for a loan, were 
previously removed (refer to Section 4.2.1.) making them easily the largest and most 
disproportionate sector in the SBA sample had they remained in the sample.  
 QCEW data also includes employment information by sector, so I also include 
information on the size of businesses approved for SBA loans by sector. This 



























11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 7 3.71 14 3.07 0.64 
21 Mining 2 27.50 44 12.89 14.61 
23 Construction 25 8.08 470 15.39 -7.31 
31-33 Manufacturing 10 6.40 189 36.35 -29.95 
42 Wholesale Trade 4 4.50 263 6.77 -2.27 
44 – 45 Retail Trade 42 6.31 797 13.81 -7.50 
48 – 49 Transportation and Warehousing 6 12.67 173 16.96 -4.29 
51 Information 1 5.00 67 11.72 -6.72 
52 Finance and Insurance 6 4.83 289 14.43 -9.59 
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 10 3.60 291 5.93 -2.33 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
28 6.46 522 5.24 1.22 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 1 5.00 20 8.40 -3.40 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
6 4.33 262 12.22 -7.89 
61 Educational Services 1 13.00 134 70.66 -57.66 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 17 6.94 486 17.00 -10.06 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 8 11.88 113 22.14 -10.27 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 32 11.91 559 21.99 -10.09 
81 Other Services 24 7.29 523 4.86 2.43 
Total 230  5216   
Average # of employees of SBA Businesses with >0 employees = 7.7 
Average # of employees Galveston County (total) = 15.3 
 
Businesses approved for an SBA loan were smaller than the average business in 
the county in all sectors except for agriculture, mining, professional services, and other 
services. Overall, businesses approved for an SBA loans were approximately 7-8 
employees smaller than the average business in Galveston County. Although physical 
disaster loans were available to businesses of all sizes, it appears that businesses that 
applied and were approved for a loan ended up being smaller; it’s possible that larger 




application data it is impossible to say for sure. This is especially interesting considering 
close to 1,000 of the ~1200 decision codes for denying an application were related to 
insufficient credit or lack of repayment ability; the literature review (Section 2.1) 
suggests that larger businesses are likely to have more resources (repayment ability). 
Therefore, it’s most plausible that larger businesses did not apply. However, without the 
individual point data, it is also possible that smaller businesses were more likely to have 
been inundated and/or damaged.   
To check this, then, I use the ReferenceUSA point data for Galveston County. 
Although the data has proven to be somewhat messy (see Section 4.2), it still gives the 
opportunity to compare SBA-approved businesses to only the businesses that were 
damaged as opposed to the overall business population. First, I removed the 
ReferenceUSA businesses whose geolocation was outside the county line, leaving me 
with 10,856 businesses. From there, I removed businesses whose sales were zero 
(indicating a non-profit, n=1,663), businesses with no flood damage based on the 
continuous flood depth measure (n=5,813), those in sector 22 (indicating a utility 
company, n=7), and those missing sector information (n=12). Table 28 shows the sector 









Table 29 Flooded Businesses Receiving SBA Loans by Sector Compared to Total 








11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 9 4.11 6 0.18 3.93 
21 Mining 1 0.46 7 0.21 0.25 
23 Construction 23 10.50 274 8.15 2.35 
31-33 Manufacturing 8 3.65 85 2.53 1.12 
42 Wholesale Trade 5 2.28 101 3.01 -0.72 
44 – 45 Retail Trade 44 20.09 604 17.97 2.12 
48 – 49 Transportation and Warehousing 6 2.74 106 3.15 -0.41 
51 Information 1 0.46 50 1.49 -1.03 
52 Finance and Insurance 5 2.28 156 4.64 -2.36 
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 16 7.31 234 6.96 0.34 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
27 12.33 369 10.98 1.35 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 1 0.46 2 0.06 0.40 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
5 2.28 141 4.20 -1.91 
61 Educational Services 0 0.00 15 0.45 -0.45 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 14 6.39 490 14.58 -8.19 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 9 4.11 95 2.83 1.28 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 25 11.42 345 10.26 1.15 






As illustrated by the table, the sector distribution was similar for flooded SBA-
approved businesses and total flooded businesses in the county. Sector 11, agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and hunting, was slightly over-represented and sector 62, health care 
and social assistance, was under-represented. I then look at size and damage of flooded 






Table 30 Employment of Firms Receiving SBA Loans Compared To 2007 Total 
Firm Employment (QCEW). 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ReferenceUSA      
    Average flood depth 3,361 5.24 3.26 0 29.30 
    Average employment 3,361 7.86 21.91 1 500 
SBA      
    Average flood depth 219 6.29 2.80 0.32 17.44 
    Average employment 219 6.47 10.73 0 60 
 
 The average businesses that was both flooded and approved for an SBA loan had 
a higher flood depth and fewer employees than the average flooded business in the 

















Table 31 Flooded Businesses Receiving SBA Loans Employment Compared to 











11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and 
Hunting 
9 2.89 6 2.50 0.39 
21 Mining 1 10.00 7 5.57 4.43 
23 Construction 23 7.22 274 6.78 0.44 
31-33 Manufacturing 8 4.88 85 13.32 -8.44 
42 Wholesale Trade 5 3.60 101 6.94 -3.34 
44 – 45 Retail Trade 44 5.80 604 6.87 -1.07 
48 – 49 Transportation and Warehousing 6 12.17 106 10.46 1.71 
51 Information 1 5.00 50 7.94 -2.94 
52 Finance and Insurance 5 3.00 156 6.16 -3.16 
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 16 2.19 234 6.01 -3.82 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
27 6.56 369 3.74 2.82 
55 Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 
1 5.00 2 9.00 -4.00 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
5 4.80 141 6.16 -1.36 
61 Educational Services 0 0.00 15 6.87 -6.87 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 14 5.57 490 9.62 -4.05 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 9 8.89 95 8.63 0.26 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 25 10.92 345 15.63 -4.71 
81 Other Services 20 6.90 281 4.79 2.11 
Total 219  3361   
 
SBA-Approved businesses were smaller in several sectors with the exception of 










REGRESSION ON LOAN DELAY TIMES 
 
When answering RQ1.1 and RQ1.2, loan delay from both the applicant and the 
SBA were significant variables in both analytical models. However, it’s unclear which 
types of businesses this variable might be capturing. There are several reasons why a 
business may be delayed in getting an application in to the SBA. The first might be that 
the business was highly damaged, meaning their paperwork is potentially destroyed and 
they have other recovery issues such as clearing out their business to attend to. The 
second, however, is that businesses that can afford to wait for assistance, do. Businesses 
may not apply for SBA loans until they find out how much their insurance will cover, 
whether they will receive assistance elsewhere, or even what the recovery situation will 
look like. Because these are two drastically different potential sets of businesses, I run a 
regression on factors associated with loan delay, separating the time into the applicant 
delay. I use the same variables as the models for RQ1.1 and RQ1.2, with the exception 
of the loan variables and interaction terms. The identical process outlined in Appendix F 
indicated that using the linear form of the time variables led to a violation of the 
assumptions of homoscedasticity and multivariate normality. The logged form of the 
variables, however, did not present these issues. This makes sense given that disaster 
time compression provides a theoretical justification for a multiplicative effect when it 





Table 32 OLS Regression on Applicant Delay (ln). 
Variable  Coef.     Coef.*   S.E. p-value 
   Constant 4.127 -  0.273 0.000  
Damage  
 
   
   Flood depth (ft.) 0.010 0.036  0.021 0.307  
   Average maximum wind speed (m/s) -0.001 -0.006  0.008 0.466  
Business Characteristics     
   Age of business (years) 0.008 0.119  0.005 0.042 ** 
   Length of current management (years) -0.014 -0.120  0.008 0.039 ** 
   Number of employees 0.014 0.153  0.006 0.005 ** 
   Retail business -0.076 -0.030  0.141 0.296  
   Manufacturing/Construction business 0.193 0.069  0.153 0.105  
   Home business -0.108 -0.049  0.129 0.202  
   Corporation 0.247 0.123  0.115 0.017 ** 
Area Characteristics     
   Density (1000 people/mi2) -0.003 -0.009  0.019 0.442  
   Median household income ($1000) -0.005 -0.074  0.004 0.111  
Delay  
 
   
  Applicant Delay - -  - -  
   
 





   
Root MSE 0.821  
 
   
R-Squared 0.120  
 
   
N 249          
Coef.=Beta coefficient; Coef.*=Beta coefficient standardized on X;  S.E.=Standard 
error; p=value represents 1-tailed test 
* = p ≤ 0.1; ** = p ≤ 0.05; *** = p ≤ 0.001 
 
The results show that business age, management history, size, and corporate 
status are all significant predictors of applicant delay (p<0.05). Each additional year the 
business has been established, the number of days to acceptance increases by 0.08 
percent, each additional employee increases days until acceptance by 1.4 percent, and 
corporate businesses versus other types of businesses have 24.7 percent more days until 




negative relationship with application delay; days to acceptance is reduced by 1.4 
percent for every year under the current management. Surprisingly, damage was 
insignificant. The age, size, and corporation variables suggest that the businesses that are 
more likely able to function longer in a deficit and more likely to have insurance have 
the longest delay times. The negative significance of the management variable may 
indicate that, controlling for resources, more managerial experience would help navigate 
the paperwork that has often been described as cumbersome or burdensome (Furlong & 
Scheberle, 1998; Runyan, 2006). 
 I next look at factors related to SBA approval delay, or the time it took from the 
application acceptance date to the date the loan was approved. This looks at which types 
of businesses might receive longer deliberation. Again, I use the same variables as the 














Table 33 OLS Regression on Applicant Delay (ln). 
Variable  Coef. Coef.*    S.E. p-value  
   Constant 3.387 -  0.169 0.000  
Damage  
 
   
   Flood depth (ft.) -0.006 -0.021  0.012 0.312  
   Average maximum wind speed (m/s) 0.003 0.022  0.005 0.294  
Business Characteristics     
   Age of business (years) -0.003 -0.039  0.003 0.175  
   Length of current management (years) 0.004 0.036  0.005 0.191  
   Number of employees 0.006 0.059  0.003 0.052 * 
   Retail business -0.186 -0.074  0.085 0.015 ** 
   Manufacturing/Construction business 0.012 0.004  0.093 0.451  
   Home business -0.178 -0.081  0.078 0.012 ** 
   Corporation 0.249 0.124  0.070 0.000 *** 
Area Characteristics     
   Density (1000 people/mi2) -0.017 -0.052  0.011 0.069 * 
   Median household income ($1000) -0.005 -0.074  0.002 0.021 ** 
Delay  
 
   
  Applicant Delay -0.001 -0.117  0.000 0.000 *** 
   
 
   










   
N 249         
Coef.=Beta coefficient; Coef.*=Beta coefficient standardized on X; S.E.=Standard error; 
p=value represents 1-tailed test 
* = p ≤ 0.1;  ** = p ≤ 0.05;  *** = p ≤ 0.001  
 
The results show a somewhat different set of significant variables. Being a retail 
business, being a home businesses, density, median household income, and applicant 
delay reduced the time it took for the SBA loan to be approved; being a home business 
reduced days to approval by 17.8 percent compared to storefront businesses (p<0.05), 
retail businesses reduced days to approval by 18.6 percent compared to other sectors 




by 0.5 percent (p<0.1), and each additional day of applicant delay decreased days to 
approval by 0.1 percent (p<0.001). Larger businesses and corporations had longer wait 
times, with each additional employee increasing days to approval by 0.6 percent (p<0.1) 
and a decrease in days to approval of 24.9 percent for corporations compared to other 
businesses (p<0.001).  
It still seems like delay tends to be correlated with stronger businesses, even on 
the side of the SBA. Home businesses and retail businesses likely want assistance the 
quickest. Corporations and larger businesses are more likely to have other resources, 
which will need to be checked before an approval is made. The significance of median 
household income and density may be related to information sharing and more complete 
and correct applications, which would reduce processing time controlling for the other 
variables (damage and resources). A similar logic could be applied to applicant delay, 
where the longer it took for the application to be accepted, the more complete the 
application since resources and damage are controlled for.  
  To conclude these two analyses, it appears that delay generally tended to be 
related to businesses that could be delayed.  
Lastly, Galveston had a bridge loan program after Hurricane Ike that provided 
bridge funding to businesses that were likely to receive SBA loans or insurance payouts. 
This presents an issue for using delay variables as an indicator of timeliness of funds in 
predicting survival, since the delay is not accurately capturing delay for all funding. 
Therefore, I do not use these variables in any of the other models. I believe this is not as 




should not affect loan amounts since the bridge loan program is not meant to supplement 
funds, just speed up the timing. Additionally, the theoretical variable in this model is the 
SBA timing, which should not be significantly affected, but this requires the model to 
have a control for applicant delay. For disbursement decision-making, the variable is not 
trying to capture time to first funding, but rather the certainty of the business’ financial 
landscape (businesses are more likely to know if insurance payouts are going to go 
through, they will receive private funding [including the bridge loan], etc., the longer 






JUSTIFICATION FOR TAKING THE LOG OF LOAN AMOUNT IN SECTION 5.1.1. 
 
Table 33 presents the results of the linear regression on raw (untransformed) loan 
amounts. 
 
Table 34 Predictors of Loan Amount ($10,000), Untransformed. 
Variable  Coef. S.E.  p-value  




   Flood depth (ft.) 3.063 3.958  0.220  
   Average maximum wind speed (m/s) 0.614 1.592  0.350  
Business Characteristics    
   Age (years) 4.629 0.940  0.000 *** 
   Length of current management (years) -3.088 1.550  0.024 ** 
   Number of employees 4.439 1.078  0.000 *** 
   Retail business 10.029 27.436  0.358  
   Manufacturing/Construction business 8.841 29.401  0.382  
   Home business -54.193 25.247  0.017 ** 
   Corporation 6.714 23.009  0.386  
Area Characteristics    
   Density (1000 people/mi2) -1.871 3.641  0.304  
   Median household income ($1000) 0.004 0.825  0.498  
Loan Characteristics    
   Loan Term (years) 3.443 1.037  0.001 *** 
   Economic injury loan -43.816 42.543  0.152  
   Applicant Delay 0.176 0.127  0.084 * 
   SBA Approval Delay 1.748 0.696  0.007 ** 
   
 
  
F        9.15 (p-value 0.000) 
Root MSE        157.04  
R-Squared        0.371 






From there, I saved the residuals to a new variable, “r.” I produce the kernel 
density estimation, comparing the residuals to a normal density. This is presented in 
Figure 16. I also produced a normal probability plot in Figure 17. Both results indicate 
non-normality in the residuals, which would violate the multivariate normality 
assumption of OLS regression.  
 
 































Figure 17 Normal Probability Plot for Regression on Untransformed Loan 
Amount. 
 
To test the normality of the residuals, I also conducted a Shapiro-Wilk W test for 
normal data. The null hypothesis is that the data is normally distributed; the results in 
Table 34 indicate that we reject this hypothesis.  
  
Table 35 Shapiro-Wilk Test for Regression on Untransformed Loan Amount. 
Variable Obs. W V z Prob>z 
r 249 0.84501 28.011 7.752 0.000 
 
 I then plot the fitted values against the residuals to see if there is 
heteroskedasticity, as presented in Figure 18. The variance does not appear uniform. I 
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assumption of linear regression, using the Breusch-Pagan test. We reject the null, as 
shown in Table 35.  
 
 
Figure 18 Fitted Versus Residual Values for Regression on Untransformed Loan 
Amount. 
 
Table 36 Breush-Pagan Test of Constant Variance for Regression on 




Because the previous regression violates the assumptions of homoscedasticity 
and multivariate normality, I examined the scatterplot of the continuous variables to get 
a sense of the relationship with the dependent variable. These scatterplots are presented 

























Figure 19 Scatterplot of Continuous Predictors and Untransformed Loan Amount. 
 
It appears that there may be some non-linearity in several of the independent 
variable relationships with loan amount, with observations tending to cluster in the lower 
amounts. I then took the log value of loan amounts and re-ran the same tests. 
Immediately looking at the same scatterplots in Figure 20, the relationships look 
a little more linear. The kernel density estimation and normal probability plot in Figure 
21 and Figure 22 both indicate that the residuals are more normal. When testing this as a 
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Table 37 Shapiro-Wilk Test for Regression on Logged Loan Amount. 
Variable Obs. W V z Prob>z 
r 249 0.963 1.018 -0.087 0.535 
 
 I again plot the fitted values against the residuals to see if there is 
heteroskedasticity, as presented in Figure 23. There is a definite visual improvement to 
the distribution of the residuals in terms of constant variance, as shown in Table 37, the 
visual evidence indicates that this model is still superior. 
 
Figure 23 Fitted Versus Residual Values for Regression on Logged Loan Amount. 
 
 
























CONTINUOUS VS. FACTOR USE OF THE ORDINAL FLOOD DEPTH VARIABLE 
 
This section justifies the use of a continuous measure of flood depth when the 
ordinal flood depth data is used (Section 5.2.) using a basic model of number of 
employees and flood depth on survival. 
 First, I use the continuous variable in Table: 
 
Table 39 Continuous Use of the Flood Depth Ordinal Variable (M1). 
Variable  O.R. S.E. p-value 
   Constant 0.289 0.271 0.103  
     
   Flood depth (ft.) 0.045 0.017 0.133  
   Number of employees 0.032 0.017 0.027 ** 
     
χ2 5.79 (p-value 0.055)   
2 log (L1) 304.5335   
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared 0.019   
N 246      
O.R.=Odds ratio; S.E.=Standard error; p=value represents 1-tailed test 
* = p ≤ 0.1; ** = p ≤ 0.05; *** = p ≤ 0.001 
 









Table 40 Factor Use of the Flood Depth Ordinal Variable (M2). 
Variable  O.R.       S.E.         p-value 
   Constant 0.404 0.343 0.120  
     
   Flood depth (ft.)   
<2 -0.878 0.670 0.095 * 
2-4 0.301 0.559 0.295  
4-6 -0.103 0.445 0.408  
6-8 0.397 0.432 0.179  
8-10 0.413 0.469 0.189  
>10 -0.257 0.673 0.351  
   Number of employees 0.033 0.017 0.028 ** 
     
χ2 10.45 (p-value 0.165)  
2 log (L1) 299.8707   
McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared 0.034   
N 246      
O.R.=Odds ratio; S.E.=Standard error; p=value represents 1-tailed test 
* = p ≤ 0.1; ** = p ≤ 0.05; *** = p ≤ 0.001 
 
 Then I compare the two models using a likelihood ratio test in Table 40: 
 
Table 41 Likelihood Ratio Test M1, M2. 
Model ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 
m1 
-
155.160 -152.267 3 310.5335 321.0495 
m2 
-
155.160 -149.935 8 315.8707 343.9134 
      
χ2 
4.66 (p-value 
0.458)    
N 246         
 
 The results of the likelihood ratio test, BIC test, and AIC test all show that m1 





FIXED EFFECTS LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL AS A CONDITIONAL 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ALTERNATIVE 
 
One way to avoid excluding groups from the matched analysis is to run a fixed 
effects linear probability model since the predicted probabilities have more variation 
within groups. This is similar to the conditional logistic regression in that it looks at 
differences within groups, but is a linear prediction. The results of running a fixed effect 
linear probability model with robust standard errors (XTREG FE in STATA grouped by 
















Table 42 Linear Probability Models for Matched Pairs. 
 Approved + Disbursed Disbursed Only 
Variable  Coef.     S.E.     p-value Coef. S.E. p-value  
Constant 0.166 0.365 0.325  0.441 0.422 0.115  
         
Damage        
   Flood depth (ft.) 
-
0.031 0.051 0.276  -0.056 0.061 0.153  
   Average maximum wind speed (m/s) 0.019 0.012 0.056 * 0.014 0.014 0.153  
Business Characteristics       
   Number of employees 
-
0.009 0.014 0.263  -0.015 0.015 0.156  
   Sales volume ($10,000) 0.001 0.001 0.038 ** 0.001 0.001 0.033 ** 
Treatment Status       
   Loan approved but not disbursed 
-
0.014 0.099 0.443  - - -  
   Loan disbursed 0.169 0.062 0.004 ** 0.176 0.066 0.005 ** 
Area Characteristics       
   Density (1000 people/mi2) 
-
0.024 0.015 0.059 * -0.027 0.003 0.068 * 
   Median household income ($1,000) 0.002 0.002 0.150  0.002 0.104 0.231  
Adaptation        
   Moved  0.204 0.104 0.027 ** 0.275 0.104 0.005 ** 
         
F 2.82 (p-value 0.005) 3.25 (p-value 0.003)  
Rho 0.420   0.452   
R-Squared:        
   Within 0.102   0.131   
   Between 0.022   0.009   
N 280a       212b      
Coef.=Beta coefficient; S.E.=Robust standard error; p=value represents 1-tailed test 
* = p ≤ 0.1;  ** = p ≤ 0.05;  *** = p ≤ 0.001     
a107 groups         
b83 groups         
 
 The models use the full set of observations and show disbursal to still be a 
significant and positive predictor of survival. In the first model, disbursal increased 
survival probability by 17 percent and by 18 percent in the second model. In addition, 




probability by 2-3 percent. The significance of moving was also consistent with the 
conditional logistic regression, increasing survival probability by 20 percent in the first 
model and 28 percent in the second. Sales also significantly increased survival 
probability, with each $10,000 increase in sales yielding a .01 percent increase in 
survival probability. The R2’s of the linear probability models are somewhat lower than 
the conditional logistic regression. The model with both approved-but-not-disbursed and 
disbursed businesses has a within-group R2 of .102 and the disbursed only model has a 
within-group R2 of 0.131. 
 The limitation of running a linear prediction model is that it is not constrained to 
values between 0 and 1. This is illustrated by the summary of the predicted probabilities 
for each observation in the models in Table 42. 
 
Table 43 Summary of Linear Predicted Probabilities for All Observations. 
 Obs. Mean s.d. Min Max 
Linear prediction (approved + disbursed) 280 0.664 0.249 0.144 2.061 
Linear prediction (disbursed only) 212 0.675 0.334 -0.191 2.455 
 
Predicted probabilities ranges from 0.14 to 2.06 in the first model and between -
0.19 and 2.45 in the second model.  
 
